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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that the effectiveness of the EU sanctions against Russia is often debated, there is also 
the question of the self-inflicted pain against the EUMS economies. Economic sanctions did not only 
target the Russian economy, but also hurt the EU’s. In order to agree to the sanctions, the EUMS not 
only had to accept this, but they also had to account for the extra costs caused by possible Russian 
counter-measures. The question therefore is why some EUMS with strong economic relations with 
Russia agreed to impose economic sanctions, especially because they initially objected to them. This 
thesis argues that rationalist thinking fails to provide an adequate explanation as to why some EUMS in 
the end consented to third-stage sanctions. Instead, it provides an alternative explanation which is based 
on normative institutionalist assumptions on the primacy of norms, values, and identities. Through a 
discourse analysis of the expressed reasons of two important EUMS: Germany and Italy, combined with 
an examination of the discursive framing of the crisis, this thesis argues that final consent was caused 
by a combination of normative entrapment and a logic of arguing. This conclusion helps us to understand 
the EU’s behaviour as an international actor and the mechanics behind CFSP decision-making.  
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Introduction 
 
“Do you think that the EU itself is capable of constructing a meaningful common policy 
towards Russia, given the differences between, say, Poland and Italy as well as the attitudes 
of France, Germany and this country? Is there a lowest common multiple that is worth 
anything at all, or are the interests of the member states so discordant that it is going to be 
very difficult to make anything meaningful emerge?” (House of Lords A, 20-02-2015: 8). 
 
This question was asked on July 17th 2014 by Lord Tugendhat, acting as chairman of the United 
Kingdom’s House of Lords sub-committee on external affairs, just a few hours before Malaysia Airlines 
Flight MH17 crashed in Hrabove, eastern Ukraine. Ian Bond, Director of Foreign policy at the Centre 
for European Reform and at that moment the examined witness, answered that a EU reaction was 
possible, but that it would be hard to accomplish with the differences between member states (House of 
Lords A, 20-02-2015: 8).  
Bond referred to the fact that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is part 
of the European Union’s (EU) external relations, has the requirement of unanimous consent to adopt 
common policies (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 255). The Lisbon Treaty confirmed the prerogative of the EU 
member states (EUMS) to formulate and conduct their own foreign and sanctioning policies. Each 
EUMS vote is therefore a potential veto. With diverging preferences this can cause problems in EU 
foreign policy decision-making (Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 11).  
Michael Natorski and Karolina Pomorska argue that in times of crisis, EUMS loyalty is mainly 
displayed towards their national interests instead of reaching compromises, because crises often involve 
political, military, social, economic, or financial turmoil which can threaten existing interests (2017: 
56). When different national positions are irreconcilable, the costs of compromising may be too high, 
and result in either a deadlock or an outcome of the Lowest Common Denominator (LCD) (Orsini and 
Compagnon, 2013: 275; Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 13-14). Mitchell Orenstein and Daniel Kelemen call 
this “institutional disaggregation”, the risk that member states will pursue national policies that 
undermine possible CFSP policies (2017: 88). This is especially problematic in times of crisis, when 
non-action would lead to a worsening of the situation (Saurugger, 2016: 72).  
Based on these arguments, multiple scholars and journalists expected that “the Union would fail 
to establish a common stance in response to the events in Ukraine” in 2014 because of the significant 
differences in national interests concerning Russia would obstruct possible compromises (Natorski and 
Pomorska, 2017: 56; Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 20; Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017: 87; Haukkala, 2016; 
Marten, 2015: 197; Euractiv, 20-03-2014; Financial Times 25-08-2014; New York Times, 23-06-2008).  
Despite these expectations, a collective statement was released after an extraordinary meeting 
of the European Council on March 6th 2014. The EUMS committed themselves to “additional and far 
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reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas between the European Union 
and its Member States […] and the Russian Federation” if Russia further destabilised Ukraine (European 
Council, 06-03-2014: 2). In the following months, the EU adopted a three-stage sanction regime which 
resulted in an agreement on economic sanctions on July 31st 2014. 
It was a surprise that the EUMS managed to agree within the CFSP on an issue with such 
diverging preferences (Carnegie, 2014: 11). Especially when taking into account that it was “an 
unprecedented achievement in terms of member states’ commitment to the CFSP” and that they followed 
low-cost sanctions that were mainly directed at people who had been active in the Ukraine crisis “and 
imposed no real burden on the EU” (Der Spiegel, 12-05-2014). The new measures were “unprecedented 
in both target and scope” and had “tangible repercussions on economically stricken EU member-states” 
(Fischer, 2015: 1).  
Nevertheless, German chancellor Angela Merkel noted that the EUMS were worried that the 
costs would be too high for them and that they were only interested in securing exceptions for themselves 
during the pre-negotiation talks, while others tried to avoid the subject entirely (Der Spiegel, 12-05-
2014). This caused some to argue that the EU-sanctions are a watered-down compromise, rules that can 
be easily circumvented, and thus were costless to agree to. This has led to an extensive academic debate 
on the effects of the financial and economic sanctions, as have the causes and development of the 
Ukraine crisis.  
While the relationship between Russia and the EU is well documented, the coming about of the 
EU-Russian sanctions are not. Only few scholars have approached this subject (Sjursen and Rosén, 
2017; Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017), but unfortunately these works remain too shallow in their analysis. 
Sjursen and Rosén claim to research all EUMS’ positions and reasons, but only sparsely select a few 
statements from a handful of states (2017: 21, 23, 25-32); while Orenstein and Kelemen are more 
interested in the so-called “Trojan Horses”, EUMS which Russia uses to undermine the EU sanctions 
after they were agreed, and therefore limit their analysis to assuming that the Big Three together with 
front-line states overruled opposition (2017: 89, 96, 98, 99). Both fail to deliver on the specific reasons 
why reluctant members, especially larger EUMS like Germany and Italy, consented to economic 
sanctions regardless of the significant potential economic and political costs. 
 There are two main theoretical approaches that can be used to explain the EU’s sanction regime 
towards Russia: realism and normative institutionalism (Kazharski and Makarychev, 2015: 336). The 
first is based on a logic of rational choice, the “hard pursuit of national interests”, and the requirement 
of unanimous consent (Thomas and Tonra, 2011: 13; Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009: 491). 
However, a study by Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel Thomas found little evidence supporting hard 
bargaining in the CFSP. Out of fourteen case studies covering a wide range of foreign policy areas, 
institutional settings, and EUMS’ policy preferences, only two cases supported hard bargaining with 
neither of them linked to Ukraine or Russia (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009: 493; Thomas, 2009: 
341). Furthermore, a study by Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska found that the overall majority of 
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CFSP negotiations is characterised by a spirit of consensus instead of hard-bargaining (Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2011: 1105). 
 This thesis therefore argues in favour of a normative institutionalist explanation whereby the 
sanction-regime should be understood as a case were norms trumped interests through a normative 
convergence between EUMS on the importance of international law and principles (Sjursen & Rosen, 
2017). CFSP negotiations are basically EUMS trying to justify their position with reasons and to 
convince others in order to promote a convergence of national preferences, i.e. consensus (Orsini and 
Compagnon, 2013: 274; Risse and Kleine, 2010: 709, 713; Thomas, 2009: 344; Jørgensen 2004: 12-13). 
Through argumentation, collectives have the possibility to make decisions without using coercion 
(Eriksen, 2013: 22).  
 Good reasons can however only convince if the other party accepts them as legitimate, i.e. if 
they are based on shared ideas, identities, and discourses (Sjursen, 2002: 493). These are created through 
social interaction which leads members to endorse group norms and values (Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, 
and Koop, 2011: 1126). The idea is that “the more people work together and help each other, the more 
committed they become to each other and to their common goal” (Stone, 2012: 32). Therefore, a shared 
belief, a sense of belonging to a community, and a common purpose are created, in other words a group 
identity (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 22; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1098; Dür et al, 2010: 615). 
 The normative institutionalist perception is that the CFSP is an institutionalised forum that 
operates with a group identity. It has written and unwritten rules, established practises, commonly 
accepted values, and a collaboration ethos, which legitimises and delegitimises certain policy outcomes 
and EUMS’ behaviour. Members do value being seen as “acting in accordance with the Union’s 
normative and policy commitments, regardless of their divergent preferences” (Thomas and Tonra, 
2012: 16). Group identity can therefore lead to normative entrapment.  
Normative entrapment is “the process by which Member States find it difficult to escape the 
dictates of substantive EU norms and thus accept (however reluctantly) norm-consistent policies that 
diverge from their actual preferences” (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009: 492). Positions that do not 
comply with the groups normative framework are considered illegitimate and can count on less or no 
support from peers or even be subject to social sanctions (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1105). The social 
rewards for acting within the normative are considered greater than the costs of compromising on the 
issue. Nevertheless, different but legitimate positions can determine the margins of action of a political 
community (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 262). 
Norm entrapment works if a set of norms is accepted and supported by all members of a political 
community. Nevertheless, norms are considered “autonomous sources of motivation” (Sjursen and 
Rosén, 2017: 23), which means that they are perceived subjectively. Norms included in the EU Treaties 
and the UN Charter are assessed individually and interpreted differently by EUMS. The solution brings 
us back to argumentation: political framing. This is a political tool to link preferred actions, choices, 
and issues to “pre-existing ideas and prior experiences” that are included in the EU’s normative 
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framework and prior policy commitments which have been agreed to (Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 19). 
This disempowers political opponents and the supporters of policies that are framed as incompatible. 
 Nevertheless, Carta and Braghiroli mention that agreement on a shared normative through 
entrapment is not “a sufficient requisite for action” and that material and ideational considerations must 
be combined in order to understand the logic of action (2011: 261, 263). Material interests cannot be 
excluded and, as Merkel noted, EUMS were trying to create exceptions for themselves within the pre-
negotiation talks. It is therefore possible that the CFSP agreement on economic sanctions could have 
been a deadlock or LCD as a result of hard bargaining instead of normative entrapment. This would 
mean that economic sanctions were a compromise with little effect on the Russian or EUMS economies, 
i.e. a fake action intended for the media and the public. This thesis needs to establish that the sanctions 
actually did have an effect and also caused harm to the EU’s economy in order to 1) exclude the 
argument that the sanctions were a costless compromise and 2) argue in favour of normative entrapment 
to explain why EUMS agreed to the economic sanctions despite the potential costs.  
In order to do this, this thesis will examine material conditions and interests of the selected 
EUMS and the effect the sanctions had on Russia and on them. Carta and Braghiroli have developed a 
method to establish these national interests concerning Russia which might go against the EU’s 
“”common interests and common values” vis-à-vis Russia” (2011: 261-262). By combining a material 
analysis of the national positions based on the strength of economic flows, energy dependency, support 
for energy projects, national security, and the existence of disputes; and an analysis of the political 
framing of the various stages of the crisis, one can determine which normative reasons were considered 
legitimate by the reluctant EUMS and which might have caused ideational considerations to trump over 
material ones (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 24; Eriksen, 2013: 6; Sjursen, 2002: 493; Van Dijk, 1997: 12). 
 As said before, the reasons for reluctant EUMS consent to economic sanctions have not been 
prominent within the academic debate. These reluctant members included Germany and Italy, who, 
according to several scholars and journalists, had significant economic relations with Russia and were 
not too keen on implementing economic sanctions because of the potential costs (Karolewski and Cross, 
2017: 141, 147; Romanova, 2015: 783; Der Spiegel, 12-05-2014; Le Monde, 04-03-2014; Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2014: 44, 55; MacFarlane and Menon, 2014: 100; Financial Times, 03-03-2014). Still, as two 
larger, influential, and long-time members of the EU, they have been exposed intensively to the EU’s 
normative framework (Dür, Mateo and Thomas, 2010: 615). Therefore, they are interesting to serve as 
cases in this thesis on how normative entrapment can cause EUMS to act against their material national 
interests. 
During the time-period between the decision by president Yanukovych not to sign the AA on 
November 21st 2013 and the agreement on economic sanctions on July 31st 2014, the Ukraine crisis was 
transformed by several events which also changed the position the EU and EUMS had to take. This 
thesis’ research question is therefore formulated as follows: To what extent can normative entrapment 
explain German and Italian consent to the CFSP economic sanctions against Russia, following the 
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events in Ukraine between November 21st 2013 and July 31st 2014, despite their initial reluctance due 
to potential economic and political costs?  
An analysis will be made using a discourse analysis of statements, press-releases, speeches, 
interviews, and articles of Germany’s Auswärtiges Amt and from the Italian Ministero degli Affari 
Esteri concerning sanctions, Ukraine, Russia, and the Crimea; in combination with normative 
entrapment. The key-events during this timeline help identify actors’ discursive changes by determining 
the mobilising reasons that “reveal the basis upon which collective action was decided”. This is done 
through a categorisation of arguments into categories based on: geopolitics and strategic interests, the 
power of norms and values, and the self-understanding of actors and collective identities (Sjursen and 
Rosén, 2017: 21; Börzel, Risse and Dandashly: 2015: 143; Thomas and Tonra, 2011: 12; Smith, 1996). 
Through the categorisation of German and Italian discourse during this time period one can compare the 
development of their discourse to the official EU discourse and determine whether or when they started 
using the same reasons. This would indicate a process of normative entrapment.  
This thesis aims to enhance our knowledge of the underlying mechanics of politicised CFSP 
decision-making, expand our understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and shed light on the 
EU’s struggle to find a balance between principles and pragmatism in its foreign policy. However, 
normative entrapment does not, and cannot, offer an explanation that can be used to predict future 
outcomes of EU CFSP decision-making.  
This thesis shall continue with chapter 1, which will deal with the theoretical framework, the 
formulation of hypotheses and the operationalisation of concepts. Chapter 2 will justify the research 
method and elaborate on its reliability and validity. In chapter 3 the timeline of the Ukraine crisis from 
November 21st 2013 to July 30th 2014 will be described, as well as the sanctions, the European normative 
framework, and the Russo-German and Russo-Italian economic relations. Chapter 4 contains the 
analysis, in which theories, hypotheses, operationalised concepts, and the case will be combined. This 
thesis will conclude with a summary of the analysis, which attempts to fully answer the research 
question, and is followed by a discussion of the implications of the findings.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
1.1 Theories 
1.1.1 Two-level game theory 
Robert Putnam ‘s Two Level Game Theory from his article Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic 
of two-level games, serves as the fundamental basis for this thesis. Despite it being an abstract grand-
theory it offers a framework within which national positions versus international agreements can be 
understood, because it deals with the interaction of domestic and international politics (Putnam, 1988: 
430).  
Putnam describes both negotiation stages as levels. The international sphere is called Level I 
while the domestic one is Level II. This is done for the sake of argument insofar as that the outcome of 
negotiations at Level I must be ratified at Level II. It is however not an indication of a chronological 
order. As Putnam writes “there are likely to be prior consultations and bargaining at Level II to hammer 
out an initial position for the Level I negotiations” (1988: 436).  
These prior consultations and bargaining on the formation of national interests or a national 
position on a particular issue are open to multiple actors: the state, business, interest groups, the public, 
the economy etc. Each has its own interests and preferred courses of action; and thus pressures the 
government to act accordingly (Putnam, 1988: 432). National preferences are therefore not a given, but 
are issue specific and result from a domestic process of interaction and presentation which is “oriented 
towards increasing (and possibly maximizing) national welfare in the issue-area at hand” (Saurugger, 
2016: 71; Schimmelfennig, 2015: 179; Stone, 2012: 11).  
  Finding out the positions of all parties with an interest in the matter and who had access to – 
and could therefore influence the positions of – the governments of Germany and Italy would be a thesis 
in itself. In order to determine the German and Italian relationship with Russia and the examine the basis 
for their position on the subject of economic sanctions, this thesis uses a different method which was 
developed by Carta and Braghiroli. In their article Measuring Russia´s Snag on the Fabric of the EU´s 
International Society, they argue that national positions are influenced, amongst others, by the strength 
of economic flows, energy dependence, security preferences, the existence of disputes, and projects of 
energy supply (2011: 261-262, 269-270).  
 According to Putnam, as a result of this domestic process of position formation, national 
governments have two goals in international negotiations: 1) to minimise negative consequences of 
foreign developments and 2) to satisfy domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988: 434). Since economic 
sanctions could cause harm to the EUMS economies, it could be expected that those states which would 
be hit the hardest wanted no sanctions (deadlock) or engaged in hard-bargaining (LDC), thus resulting 
in a costless compromise.  
 On the other hand, Putnam recognises that national governments try to reconcile their interests 
with international expectations (Putnam, 1988: 460). Uwe Puetter, Director of the Center for European 
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Union Research, supports this by arguing in his article Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the 
role of the Council and European Council in EU economic governance that states do focus on the 
national interest, but also that there is also a strong influence of the institutionalised negotiation setting 
and its expectations of behaviour, e.g. consensus and joint action (Puetter, 2012: 165, 175). EUMS could 
therefore be willing to accept certain agreements that are not completely in their own (material) interest.  
 
1.1.2. Normative institutionalism and normative entrapment 
The assumption that members of a political community do not cooperate solely on the basis of security 
interests and strategic calculations, i.e. material considerations, but work together with their fellow 
members based on a collective normative with behavioural expectations, i.e. ideational considerations, 
is what sets normative institutionalism apart from realism (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 263). According 
to normative institutionalism, norms can trump interests through normative convergence within an 
institutionalised setting. 
Normative convergence is caused by socialisation, which argues that over time, relationships 
between members of the same organisation will bind them closer together (Dür et al, 2010: 615). 
Through intense interaction within an institutionalised context, members will “developed similar 
understandings, a sense of community and belonging, and even a sense of common purpose” (Sjursen 
and Rosén, 2017: 22; Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 87; March and Olsen, 2004: 5). 
This happens especially when: 1) new situations arise with high uncertainty which make old ideas 
inadequate and fosters the embrace of new ideas, 2) the community has authority to act on behalf of the 
constituents, 3) members are exposed intensely and consistently to the community’s ideas, 4) norms and 
rules have high legitimacy in the community, 5) the environment must encourage deliberation, and 6) 
domestic resonance of community ideas is high (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 89).  
In other words, social interaction leads members to become committed to each other and 
endorse, legitimise, and maintain a normative framework that covers shared assumptions on collective 
and individual roles, identities, rights, obligations, interests, world views, memories, causal 
relationships, problem solving, and norms and values, i.e. instrumental and principled ideas (Leuffen, 
Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 85; Bickerton, 2011: 86; Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, and Koop, 
2011: 1126; Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 263; March and Olsen, 2004: 11). These instrumental and 
principled ideas describe the community’s desired goals and principles of (international) political order, 
the collective standards or rules of appropriate behaviour, and what is considered appropriate behaviour 
by which to achieve these principles and goals (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1099). 
 According to Sjursen and Rosén, a further distinction should be made between value-based 
norms and rights-based norms, with the first grounded in the identity, values, and traditions of a political 
community and considered fundamental to being a member, and the second meaning morally 
independent assumptions that refer to what is deemed right or just (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 22-23). 
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Combined, this shared normative creates a sense of belonging to a community with a common purpose, 
in other words a group identity (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1098; Dür et al, 2010: 615). Collective 
identities express a sense of belonging to a distinct group and are based on the entirety of the group’s 
ideas and on (in)formally agreed-upon interpretations of both kinds of norms (Aggestam, 2004: 82). 
Therefore, they legitimise or delegitimise certain policy outcomes and behaviour.  
The concept that links group identity to foreign policy, is role. Lisbeth Aggestam argues that 
roles function as “road-maps” for foreign policy makers in “navigating through a complex political 
reality” (2004: 82). According to her, the foreign policy of political communities can be analysed 
through three types of roles: role expectation, role conception, and role performance (2004: 88; Tonra, 
2003: 743). Based on a community’s normative framework a situation is defined, and desired goals and 
appropriate behaviour in order to pursue them are agreed. Members are expected to set their goals and 
behaviour within the shared normative framework. Nevertheless, a member has its own role conception 
and might have different or even rivalling normative and material preferences. Normative 
institutionalism thus combines both role expectation, i.e. institutional formal and informal limits of 
behaviour, and role conception, i.e. national interests and expected behaviour, in order to explain role 
performance (Aggestam, 2004: 89-90; March and Olsen, 2004: 4).  
  Realists argue that actors will choose to act based on a logic of consequences, i.e. in pursuance 
of their own interests, if their cost-benefit analysis indicates that this will maximise their gains (or 
minimises their losses). Normative institutionalists argue though that members of a political community 
will act in accordance with a logic of appropriateness (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 
85; March and Olsen, 2004). The logic of appropriateness means that actors “do not judge alternative 
courses of action by the consequences for their utility, but by what is expected of them by their peers 
based on shared values, norms, and identities, or their social obligations” (Leuffen, Rittberger and 
Schimmelfennig, 2013: 87; Aggestam, 2004: 82).  
 Daniel Thomas and Ben Tonra argue in favour of action as a logic of appropriateness based on 
the normative institutionalist assumptions on the behavioural expectations of a shared normative 
framework and group identity. They write in their article To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending 
Approaches to the Union’s Diplomatic Objectives and Representation, that within the EU, members 
value being seen as “acting in accordance with the Union’s normative and policy commitments, to the 
extent that they are less/un-willing to insist on their preferences if they are inconsistent with the EU’s 
normative framework and commitments (Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 16, 21). They call this normative 
entrapment, i.e. “the process by which Member States find it difficult to escape the dictates of 
substantive EU norms and thus accept (however reluctantly) norm-consistent policies that diverge from 
their actual preferences” (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009: 492).  
Basically, the idea is that in the EU member states agreed on several common principles and 
values and accepted to bind themselves to a set of rules in their relations with one another which they 
either wrote down in the acquis communautaire or are unwritten long-standing practises. These rules 
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are thus part of member states’ own identities and norm sets. They prescribe correct behaviour, shape 
expectations, and rationalise, justify, and limit actions (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 264, 266). EUMS 
expect that behaving in accordance with the EU’s (and thus their own) normative framework will give 
them social rewards and acting outside the normative framework will be subject to social sanctions, 
because national positions that do not comply with the EU’s normative framework are considered 
illegitimate and can count on less or no support from fellow EUMS (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1105). 
It is therefore better to accept the costs of compromising on an issue and gain (external and internal) 
social rewards for acting within the normative.  
According to Thomas’ theory and a study done by Schimmelfennig and Thomas, normative 
entrapment is likely to overcome conflicting EUMS material considerations when there are five 
conditions present: determinacy, precedent, relevance, forum, and publicity (Thomas, 2009: 494). The 
crucial combination is the first three. Without those, members are dis-entrapped (Schimmelfennig and 
Thomas, 2009: 499).  
Determinacy refers to the clarity of a norm. Social differences among EUMS contribute to both 
the definition and interpretation of common norms (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 261). A norm’s meaning 
and behavioural implications may be clear to one member state, but might be less so to another. It is 
therefore necessary to discriminate between different types of norms, their legitimacy, and validity. In 
other words, not all norms matter in a given situation, only those with a clear shared understanding of 
behavioural implications (Bickerton, 2011: 80).  
 Precedent concerns the EU’s prior policies and political commitments over a given issue. 
Commitments create obligations to stay on an adopted course of action because change is costly due to 
invested financial, economic, and political resources (Thomas, 2009: 346; Lintonen, 2004: 31). These 
pledges are determined through an analysis of rhetorical commitments and treaties (Thomas, 2009: 344). 
The third, relevance, means that the normative that is used to refer to an issue must be applicable 
to that issue. In other words, a policy build on a certain principle only traps EUMS as long as that norm 
is still applicable, e.g. development aid to a poor country as long as that country is poor. If there’s no 
applicability then the argument for action is illogical and states are dis-entrapped, meaning that they will 
no longer be bound to the rationale for action. An example is when an undeveloped country becomes 
rich and successful. In that case it is no longer logical to give development aid (Thomas, 2009: 346).  
The last two, forum and publicity, are not critical for normative entrapment to happen. Still, 
when measured positively, they add to the plausibility that normative entrapment was responsible for an 
outcome of international negotiations. Forum is when all participants are member of the institution in 
which they operate and when the institutionalised setting promotes the likelihood of argumentative 
persuasion (Orsini and Compagnon, 2013: 274; Eriksen, 2013: 8; Thomas, 2009: 346). And the last, 
publicity, is positive when an issue is under significant public attention so the public will notice and 
possibly disapprove of noncompliance with norms or policy commitments (Thomas, 2009: 346; Risse 
and Kleine, 2010: 713).  
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1.1.3. Political framing 
Determinacy and relevance are the main concepts here. A community’s normative framework needs to 
be accepted as legitimate by its constituents. This requirement for normative entrapment means that the 
community’s norms and values are commonly understood to imply a certain thing and that there is 
agreement on the behavioural implications. On the other hand, there is the requirement that the 
community’s normative is commonly understood to be applicable to the situation at hand. This means 
that there can be different interpretations of the same normative between the members. 
Norms, including those in the EU Treaties and the UN Charter, are therefore assessed 
individually by the EUMS (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 23). The common understanding of norms, values, 
and identities determines which are considered legitimate interests and goals, thus limiting the policy 
options to pursue national interests (Aggestam, 2004: 82). Behavioural expectations therefore depend 
on an inter-subjective understanding of a norm’s or value’s applicability, its behavioural prescription, 
and of course “depending on how they expect the proposal to affect them” (Stone, 2012: 29).  
Because norms have different and changing subjective meanings depending on the identification 
of the situation, they function as persuasive tools of argumentation, not as accepted-by-all prescribers 
of behaviour (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 266). Members will try to explain, justify, and legitimate their 
positions, policy preferences, and reasons to act or not, based on their interpretations of the normative’s 
determinacy, relevance, and group identity (Risse and Kleine, 2010: 711; Aggestam, 2004: 83). This is 
called a logic of arguing, or the presenting and hearing of reasons through political discourse in order 
to convince others of the legitimacy their positions and preferred actions (Sjursen, 2002: 493).  
Because norms are interpreted differently, based for instance on national security and economic 
considerations, following them is a rational choice. (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 268). This leads to an 
argumentation process within international decision-making, that unfolds typically in three steps: 1) 
claims-making, 2) justification, and 3) learning (Eriksen, 2013: 12). Every process starts with a claim 
which has to be explained and justified in institutionalised forums, whereafter others accept or comply 
with the claim and change their preferences (Eriksen, 2013: 1).  
Claims-making happens when one or more actors call for a collective decision to solve a 
problem, to resolve a conflict, or to achieve a goal in a certain way (Eriksen, 2013: 14). The logic of 
arguing assumes that a claim, when connected to clear shared norms, values, and institutionalised 
decision-making rules, creates a common interest (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 88). 
For this a pre-existing value-consensus amongst the community is needed.  
Justification is needed because there is often disagreement about a claim. It happens through 
political framing, i.e. linking preferred actions, choices, and issues pre-existing ideas and prior 
experiences” (Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 19; Dunmire, 2012: 736; Stone, 2012: 36, Thomas, 2009: 345). 
In giving a reason for action, a problem/situation is framed in such a way that inaction is not an option. 
This is done through the concepts of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. The Self is often described and valued positively 
through describing the actions and identity of the Other in negative terms. This creates a positive vision 
 
19 The EU-Russian Sanctions 
of a community with shared values as opposed to the other whose values are different, e.g. “European 
exceptionalism” (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017: 25-32; Thomas and Tonra, 2011: 13-26; Smith, 1996: 14-
16). By describing the Self-identity based on the actions and identity of the Other in a given 
problem/situations, makes the identification and a common understanding therefore context-dependent 
(Larsen, 2004: 73; Van Dijk, 1997: 28).  
Then a policy alternative is presented, which legitimacy is based on the community’s shared 
norms and values, and a cost-benefit analysis (Eriksen, 2013: 7; Sjursen, 2002: 494). This is done in 
order to disempower political opponents and the supporters of policies that are framed as incompatible, 
in favour of one’s own goals (Saurugger, 2016: 75). Subsequently, these reasons are compared by third 
party members to other claims and their own interests, identities, norms, values etc.  
The last step is either actors changing their opinions or to accept an agreement despite having a 
different opinion. This could be because they were 1) convinced by the better argument and accept its 
legitimacy and validity (Eriksen, 2013: 5), 2) were under social pressure to adhere to common norms 
and values, or 3) faced a sanctioning force of naming, shaming, and blaming (Eriksen, 2013: 23; March 
and Olsen, 2004: 4). The threats of social pressure and sanctioning could compel members to consent 
to an agreement for tactical or strategic reasons. Consensus - and normative entrapment for that matter 
- does not require all members agreeing for the same reason.  
The outcomes of international negotiations do therefore not necessarily reflect the constellations 
of material preferences and bargaining power, but instead are subject to a shared normative framework, 
a group identity, and the power of the better argument. When enough actors use or accept a certain 
discourse to describe a social action, this implies that they agree on a common perception of that action. 
EUMS can thus be trapped inside the EU’s normative and act against their self-interest. 
1.2 Hypotheses  
The research question was: To what extent can normative entrapment explain German and Italian 
consent to the CFSP economic sanctions against Russia, following the events in Ukraine between 
November 21st 2013 and July 31st 2014, despite their initial reluctance due to potential economic and 
political costs?  
Normative entrapment assumes that EUMS value being seen as “acting in accordance with the 
community’s normative and policy commitments” to the extent that they are less/unwilling to insist on 
their material preferences if they are inconsistent with the EU’s normative framework and commitments 
(Thomas, 2009: 345). Nevertheless, the explanatory value of normative entrapment depends on whether 
the sanctions were a costless compromise due to hard bargaining within the CFSP. If they were not, i.e. 
if they were effective, then realism cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for German and Italian 
consent, which makes normative entrapment a more likely explanation. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis deals with establishing whether the economic sanctions had an 
effect on the Russian, and on the German and Italian economies. This thesis assumes that they did and 
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were not a compromise which could have been agreed to without inducing costs. If H1, proves to be 
correct, then Germany and Italy consented to effective economic sanctions, thus accepting the potential 
costs. In that case, normative entrapment could provide the explanation for their consent.  
Furthermore, it is public knowledge that the Ukraine crisis started with the EU offering an AA 
to Ukraine and president Yanukovych’ decision not to sign. The EU clearly had policy and political 
commitments to, and investments in, Ukraine at the start of the crisis. Precedent, as a condition of 
normative entrapment can thus be accepted a priori as true. 
The other two critical conditions which enable normative entrapment are determinacy and 
relevance. Based on these conditions and political framing, two hypotheses have been formulated which 
assume that Germany and Italy accepted the applicability of the EU’s normative framework to the 
situation of the Ukraine crisis and accepted a common interpretation. Nevertheless, since they felt 
reluctant to accept, this thesis also assumes that despite accepting the common interpretation, they did 
not accept the behavioural implications.  
Finally, the fourth hypothesis is an assumption about the reason and political framing, which 
serves as the mechanism for norm entrapment to overcome national interests, that caused both EUMS 
to agree. The assumption is based on the issue of group identity and the framing of the positive Self 
versus the negative actions and behaviour of the Other, in this case Russia.  
1. The economic sanctions have had a significant effect on Russia and on the EUMS’ economies. 
2. Germany and Italy considered the EU’s identified normative framework to be applicable to the 
Ukraine crisis. 
3. A) The EU’s identified normative framework was considered uncontroversial by Germany and 
Italy. 
B) The EU’s identified normative framework had no clear behavioural implications. 
4. Accepting the framed identity of Russia as an untrustworthy dialogue partner drove Germany 
and Italy to consent to economic sanctions 
In abstract, the relationship between the hypotheses is as follows: 
 
Figure 1 Abstract relationship between hypotheses 
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1.3 Concepts and operationalisation 
1.3.1 Crisis 
The events in Ukraine are referred to as a crisis. According to Sabine Saurugger’s article Sociological 
Approaches to the European Union in Times of Turmoil, a crisis can refer to political, military, social, 
economic, or financial turmoil in a given context (Saurugger, 2017: 72). Basically, it is “an environment 
in which its definition itself evolves and within which the interests and identities of actors/policy-makers 
develop and change” accordingly (Saurugger, 2016: 71). Furthermore, a crisis must be perceived as an 
emergency, meaning that non-action would lead to a worsening of the situation (Saurugger, 2016: 72).  
The perception of a crisis is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty concerning its origins, 
its analysis, and the possible choices of action. This explains the different interests and identities; and 
the divergent solutions actors have in a crisis. Actors try to frame crises according to their changing 
interests and identities. They do this through political discourse in which they describe a crisis as a threat 
to their own, or their political group’s, core values and/or the functioning of institutions to which they 
are a member. Political framing is meant to persuade fellow members to change their perceptions of the 
crisis and to accept certain solutions (Saurugger, 2016: 73; Puetter, 2012: 170-171). 
Persuasion is the acceptance of the better argument and a subsequent change in preferences. 
Actors whose preferences are not in line with those of the identities, norms, and values of the 
institutional community are subjected to social sanctions, such as shaming, shunning, social exclusion, 
and reproachment. To avoid these ‘sanctions’ or to restore their reputation as a legitimate member of 
the community, actors conform to the legitimate reasons and behaviour (sometimes without changing 
their convictions) (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 94; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 
1099). 
The identification of the Ukraine crisis in the run-up to the EU’s adoption of economic sanctions, 
has probably developed according to the development of the crisis. The crisis therefore can be divided 
into several stages, or key events,: S1, S2, S3
  S*. To this end, a timeline was created, with nine stages 
(figure 1):  
S1. 21-11-2013 
- Yanukovych suspends the signing of the EU Association Agreement in Vilnius. 
S2. 22-02-2014 
- Yanukovych ousted from power. 
S3. 27/28-02-2014 
- Violence in the Crimea. 
S4. 01-03-2014 
- Russian parliament approves the use of force in Ukraine. 
S5. 16-03-2014 
- Crimean referendum. 
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Figure 2 Timeline of key events in development of the Ukraine crisis until July 31st 2014. 
S6. 07-04/11-05-2014 
- Donetsk and Luhansk protests and referenda. 
S7. 27-06-2014 
- Signing of EU Association Agreement with Ukraine. 
S8. 17-07-2014 
- Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 shot down over eastern Ukraine. 
S9. 29/31-07-2014 
- EU economic sanctions against Russia approved unanimously. 
 
1.3.2 Determinacy 
In the EU, norms and values are either formalised in various documents, such as the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the Lisbon Treaty; are 
accepted in uncontested identities, or are long-standing practises (Natorski and Pomorska, 2017: 55; 
Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 94). These are considered more legitimate than lower-
ranking documents, contested identities, or recent practises; because their behavioural implications and 
meaning are more likely to be subject to debate.  
Norms and values that are included in the acquis communautaire have secured official 
democratic legitimation, because they would have had to be officially accepted and ratified by national 
governments, legislators, and sometimes even directly by the people through referenda (Bickerton,2011: 
85). A normative that is based on the EU Treaties, uncontested identities, or long standing practises, is 
therefore more likely to cause normative entrapment. Thomas’ determinacy can thus be measured by 
analysing the normative that is used as a foundation for an CFSP agreement, and determine whether 
they are part of the EU’s Treaties or are based on uncontested identities and practises within the CFSP.  
Examples of norms and values which are enshrined in the EU Treaties, are part of an uncontested 
identity, or resulted from long-standing practises are: democracy, respect for the rule of law, the non-
use of force, human rights, territorial integrity, communication, the principle of joint action, cooperation, 
and consensus (Thomas, 2009: 344).  
 
1.3.3 Relevance and discourse categories 
In order to determine whether Germany and Italy considered the EU’s normative framework for CFSP 
action relevant and applicable, i.e. Thomas’ second condition for normative entrapment, a systematic 
analysis is made of the acceptance of normative arguments, institutionalised practises, or identities by 
EUMS as being applicable to a crisis.  
An inter-subjective understanding of norms and values is indicated by their inclusion in EUMS’ 
discourse to explain and justify their positions and preferences. In order to determine whether Germany 
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and Italy shared the EU’s identification of violated norms in the Ukraine crisis, their discourse during 
the different stages must be compared to that of the EU.  
To this end, four discourse categories were created using articles by Sjursen and Rosén (2017: 
21), Börzel, Risse and Dandashly (2015: 143), Thomas and Tonra (2011: 12), Thomas (2009: 344) and 
Smith, (1996). They are based on realist and normative institutionalist assumptions on the dominance 
of security matters and strategic interests, the influence of shared norms and values, and the self-
understanding of actors in combination with collective identities. Through categorising discourse by the 
German and Italian foreign ministries regarding Ukraine, Russia, the Crimea, and sanctions and compare 
it with categorised EU discourse, one can determine if they used the same discourse to refer to the 
Ukraine crisis. This would indicate that the EU’s perception of the crisis was shared by both EUMS and 
that they therefore considered these norms to be applicable to the situation. For the four categories, see 
figure 2.  
 Institutional discourse 
- Established norms of conduct and expectations of behaviour within the CFSP: 
 Consistency and coherence in EU foreign policy across time and issue-areas. 
 Decision-making by consensus. 
 Joint action. 
 Regular communication and consultation. 
 Geopolitical discourse 
- Threats to economic, political, and territorial security of the EU and its  
member states: 
 Energy dependency. 
 Security threats to the EU. 
 Security threats to member states.  
 The importance of economic relations. 
 Legal discourse 
- Norms and values that are laid down in the European Treaties: 
 Democracy. 
 Dialogue. 
 Diplomacy. 
 Human rights and freedoms. 
 International cooperation. 
 Non-use of violence. 
 Peace. 
 Rule of law. 
 Self-determination. 
 Sovereignty. 
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Figure 3 Discourse categories. 
Figure 4 Discourse categories 
 Territorial integrity 
 Cultural discourse 
- Positive identification of the ‘self’ versus the negative identification of the ‘other’: 
 21st century. 
 Aggression. 
 Annexation. 
 Euromaidan. 
 Interference.  
 Zero-sum games. 
 Geopolitics. 
 Realpolitik. 
 
1.3.5 Determining national positions 
In order to systematically analyse and compare German and Italian positions and attitudes towards 
Russia, this thesis uses a variation of Carta and Braghiroli’s method (2011: 271). Anke Schmidt-
Felzmann argues that national positions depend partly on their historical and geographic experiences 
with Russia (2014: 55). The differences between, what Donald Rumsfeld once called, Old Europe and 
New Europe concerning their positions on Russia are taken into account in this method (Bickerton, 
2011: 34). Old Europe concerns the EUMS before 2004 and new Europe are those who entered the EU 
after that year. Old Europe wants to spread its normative through economic integration, while new 
Europe perceives Russia as a threat to regional security and often calls for a severe stance (2011: 261). 
This is because they have experienced that trade and energy were used by Russia as a pressure tool 
(Schmidt-Felzmann, 2014: 55).  
The method used in this thesis uses five of the six indicators used by Carta and Braghiroli. Their 
sixth indicator concerns religion, i.e. if a country is Christian orthodox or not, and does not apply to 
either Germany or Italy (2011: 270). Therefore, it has been excluded in this research. 
The first indicator is based on the Russian share of trade of an EUMS’ total extra-EU trade. The 
second is based on the same process, but now Russian gas as a share of an EUMS’ total gas import. The 
support for energy projects is based on a member’s support or opposition to energy projects that link the 
EU closer to Russia, or when a member has taken no clear position. Indicator four deals with the either 
perceived or unperceived threat to a member’s national security and number five signals the presence 
of territorial, diplomatic, or commercial disputes (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 270-271).  
 The following formula is used to determine a EUMS´ score on a Russian Friendliness Scale 
(RFS): 
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The outcome will be between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest rate of friendliness towards Russia 
and 0 being the opposite (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 271). There are four categories: ‘normative 
adamant’ (0-0,25), ‘normative intransigent’ (0,26-0,50), ‘normative malleable’ (0,51-0,75), and 
‘normative docile’ (0,76-1). The first group is obstinate versus Russia and consider many issues to be 
security concerns. The second group is characterised by those who “unfreezed their relationship with 
Russia” (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 274). The third group tries to cooperate with Russia and overall 
has significant economic exchanges or energy dependencies. Finally, the fourth group has solid cultural, 
historical, and economic relations with Russia and has no disputes.  
   
Indicators Perceptions and social 
differences 
Variables 
1. Strength of economic 
ties as a share of total 
trade 
Economic relations with 
Russia are viewed by old 
Europe as positive and 
new Europe as a form of 
dependence 
Strength of economic relationships: 
- 0 (strong ties with Russia New Europe) 
- 0,33 (less strong ties with Russia New Europe) 
- 0,66 (less strong ties with Russia Old Europe) 
- 1 (strong ties with Russia Old Europe) 
2. Energy dependence as 
a share of total import 
The level of energy 
dependence is different 
for the EU member 
states. Also the new 
Europe perceives this as 
Russian dominance, 
while old Europe 
perceives it as positive 
economic development 
Level of energy dependence:  
- 0 (large exchanges with Russia New Europe) 
- 0,33 (small exchanges with Russia New Europe) 
- 0,66 (small exchanges with Russia Old Europe) 
- 1 (large exchanges with Russia Old Europe) 
3. Energy projects Some member states 
promote energy 
independence from 
Russia, while others 
bilaterally negotiate 
energy projects with 
Russia 
Support for energy projects: 
- 0 (support Nabucco or oppose Northern Stream) 
- 0,5 (no clear position, because not reliant on 
Russian sources) 
- 1 (support for Northern and/or Southern Stream) 
4. National security Some members consider 
Russian action in 
Ukraine a threat to their 
Considering Russian interference in Ukraine a threat: 
- 0 (yes) 
- 1 (no) 
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national security, while 
others do not. 
5. Presence of disputes The presence of disputes 
with Russia may cause 
some member states to 
advocate for a more 
severe stance on Russia 
Presence of relevant disputes: 
- 0 (no disputes) 
- 1 (disputes) 
Table 1 Based on Carta and Braghiroli, 2011:268- 270. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Justification 
The decision was made to only do an analysis of those EU documents that established the Union’s 
official discourse on the situation in Ukraine, and of statements made by the German Auswärtiges Amt 
and the Italian Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale on that event, the 
framing of the crisis during the different stages, and the explanation and justification of their (changing) 
national positions. Additionally, secondary literature provided perspectives, historical, economic, and 
political contexts, and the possibility to draw a comparison between this thesis’ data and those of other 
scholars (Hardy, Harly and Phillips, 2004: 19). 
 The decision to not include interviews can be considered a liability. The book Social research 
methods by Alan Bryman deals specifically with the reality of documents. It states that “we cannot … 
learn through written records alone how an organization actually operates day by day” (2012: 555). 
Nevertheless, this decision was taken because 1) CFSP negotiations are classified, and 2) because of 
practical and time limitations. Nevertheless, data from interviews would have been of added-value in 
finding extra support for the findings from the discourse analysis.  
 
2.2 Data sampling 
Purposive sampling was used as a method to gather data. This means that the data was sampled “with 
reference to the goals of the research” so that the cases, which are the units of analysis, will provide 
relevant data for the analysis and to answer the research question (Bryman, 2012: 418). Within purposive 
sampling, there are different approaches. In choosing the cases for this thesis, critical case sampling 
was used to select two cases to allow the hypotheses to be tested (Bryman, 2012: 419).  
 Critical case sampling seeks to find critical cases “that permit a logical inference about the 
phenomenon of interest” (Bryman, 2012: 419). In this thesis, the cases have been selected because they 
provide the opportunity to test the possibility that normative entrapment can bring EUMS to act against 
their material interests.  
The following factors were combined in order to select critical samples from the EUMS: 1) their 
geographical position, 2) their position on economic sanctions (hardliner, middle ground, reluctant), and 
3) economic ties. Since there are three main positions on sanctions, and three main geographical zones 
(Western, Central, Eastern) it seems right to pick three countries. However, for practical reasons and the 
limits of a Master thesis only two have been selected, Germany and Italy.  
 First, these EUMS had a good political relationship with Russia. An approved Russian foreign 
policy document from 2013 states explicitly that Germany Italy (amongst others) are seen as helpful for 
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“advancing Russia’s national interests in European and world affairs […]” (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Russia, February 18th 2013).  
Second, both have strong economic relationships with Russia. Eurostat shows that before the 
sanctions, Germany alone accounted for almost a third of the EU’s total exports to Russia in the first 
nine months of 2013, followed by Italy with 9%, and the Netherlands, Poland and France with each 
around 7%. Germany was also the largest importer with 19%, followed by the Netherlands (14%), and 
Italy (10%) (Eurostat, 24-01-2014). These EUMS stood most to lose from any sanctions implemented. 
Schmidt-Felzmann argues that because of this, these countries (specifically Germany, France, and Italy) 
have often been criticised and blamed for the soft EU policy on Russia (2014: 8). 
Last, and most critical, is that Germany and Italy were considered to be sceptic (Sjursen and 
Rosén, 2017: 20), unenthusiastic (Natorski and Pomorska, 2017: 62), reluctant (Karolewski and Cross, 
2017: 138), or cautious about economic sanctions and more in favour of diplomacy in order to avoid 
economic costs (Der Spiegel, May 12th 2014). This makes them interesting cases because on July 31st 
2014, economic sanctions against Russia were unanimously agreed to. Both EUMS had changed their 
position despite the potentially significant economic, financial, and/or political costs. They are therefore 
critical cases in researching the question why economic sanctions were eventually agreed.  
Collected data for this thesis includes primary data for the EU, consisting of the European 
Treaties, the official conclusions and press releases after Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), Council, and 
European Council meetings on the crisis in Ukraine between November 21st 2013 and July 31st 2014, 
and statements, speeches, press releases, articles, and interviews of the foreign ministries of Germany 
and Italy of that same period. The foreign ministries were selected, because of 1) Putnam’s assumption 
that negotiators have no personal preferences, but simply have the will to “achieve an agreement that 
will be attractive” to the constituents and that will be legitimate in the eyes of fellow member´s (1988: 
436) and 2) deliberative intergovernmentalism, which assumes that deliberative processes are likely to 
move upwards from committees to more senior decision-makers when the stakes are high. The focus 
should therefore be on ministers and the heads of government and state in the Council and the European 
Council, because this group of actors is “the only one which can exercise sufficient political leadership 
in order to ensure policy implementation and coherence” (Puetter, 2012: 164). Furthermore, official 
foreign policy discourse legitimises state action, because it is issued by those with official authority to 
implement those policies (Hansen, 2006: 53). 
Both websites of the foreign ministries were used for systematic data gathering based on specific 
search terms. For Germany, the Federal Foreign Office’s (Auswärtiges Amt) web archive provided a 
wealth of information on speeches, interviews, press releases, and articles by minister Guido 
Westerwelle (FDP) Frank-Walter Stein Meier (SPD) and minister of state for Europe Michael Roth 
(SPD). Using this archive, a discourse database was created with 46 press releases, 27 speeches made 
by either the foreign minister or the minister of state for Europe, 31 interviews, and 63 articles, all 
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between November 21st 2013 and July 31st 2014 and concerning Ukraine and Russia. See annexes A and 
B. 
The same for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Ministero 
degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale), which provides an online archive of press 
releases, speeches, and interviews/articles issued by the foreign ministry and the two consecutive foreign 
ministers Emma Bonino (RI), Federica Mogherini (PD). With the help of this archive a database has 
been created with 36 press releases, 1 speech, 19 interviews and articles, and 58 detailed statements. See 
annexes C and D.  
 
2.3 Research method 
Without theory there is nothing but description, and without methodology there is no transformation of 
theory into analysis. In this thesis, a combination of deductive and qualitative research methods is used. 
Scientific deduction means that existing theoretical considerations are used to formulate expectations in 
a given situation. In order to find out if these hypotheses are correct, they must be operationalised into 
researchable entities, i.e. specify “how data can be collected in relation to the concepts that make up the 
hypotheses” (Bryman, 2012: 24). The findings are then used to confirm, falsify, or add to existing 
theories. 
 The hypotheses work in relation to a unit of observation and a unit of analysis. The first refers 
to the level at which data is collected, in this thesis these are the outcomes of CFSP meetings, statements 
by the German foreign ministry, and statements by the Italian foreign ministry between November 21st 
2013 and July 31st 2014. These are further divided into different data points to collect data at different 
intervals, because crises develop and change. The unit of analysis on the other hand, is what this thesis 
tries to research, namely that normative entrapment can explain the outcome of CFSP economic 
sanctions against Russia.  
 Qualitative data analysis assumes a different epistemology to positivism. It is used to verstehen, 
understand, through hermeneutics, which is the study of understanding and interpreting human action 
through analysing texts (Bryman, 2012: 28-29). It is based on Max Weber’s advocacy of social science 
as an attempt of “interpretative understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation 
of its course and effects” (Bryman, 2012: 29). This thesis combines deduction with a qualitative data 
analysis into something which Hsieh and Shannon call directed content analysis (2005: 1281). Its goal 
is to validate existing theories and/or expectations by basing the research question, hypotheses, and 
variables on existing research and theories (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1281). 
The research question is answered through, what Bryman calls, a thematic approach (2012: 578-
581). It creates a framework for ordering data according to themes, i.e. recurring motives in texts. These 
themes are based on theoretical assumptions and the data itself; and allows for a systematic analysis of 
qualitative data by looking at repetitions, transitions, similarities or differences, and linguistic 
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connectors (Bryman, 2012: 580). In this thesis, the four themes are: institutional, geopolitical, legal, and 
cultural discourse. This approach creates the possibility to methodically and systematically examine the 
statements from the German and Italian ministries of foreign affairs. 
 Normative entrapment is indicated by the Schimmelfennig and Thomas’ critical combination of 
a normative framework for agreement being perceived as relevant to the situation and uncontroversial 
with clear behavioural implications. A thematic approach can categorise discourse and systematically 
review it for similarities, differences, and discursive changes, which indicate compliance with the EU’s 
discourse, or a rejection.  
 
2.4 Reliability and validity 
The reliability and validity of scientific research is of paramount importance. Reliability concerns the 
replicability of research and its results. Therefore, the methods and definitions should be described in 
such a way that it is possible for another scholar to do the exact same research and get the same findings. 
If replicated analysis gets the same results, then research can be considered reliable. Qualitative 
research’ inherent problem is that it is subjective, meaning that interpretation and assumptions are 
personal instead of objective scientific laws which are the same for all. This makes replicability a 
problem. 
 Nevertheless, a detailed description of the theories, concepts, operationalisation, data collection, 
research method, and the analysis of this thesis, should provide enough information for other scholars 
to understand the interpretations and assumptions made and to come to the same conclusions. The 
reliability of this thesis can therefore be ascertained.  
 Validity concerns the integrity of scientific conclusions based on the findings. There are four 
kinds of validity that academic research must address: measurement, internal, external, and ecological. 
The first involves operationalisation. Are concepts and theories defined in such a way that they can be 
measured correctly? Or in other words, does what is measured truly represent the concept? Without 
measurement validity the findings do not answer the research question and conclusions will be false. In 
this thesis, measurement validity is assured because operationalisation was done based on theories and 
the data was categorised based on this operationalisation, thereby providing proof to confirm or falsify 
the hypotheses. 
 Internal validity deals with the causal relationship between variables. The deductive approach 
means that the hypotheses were based on theory. In this thesis the hypotheses are one hypothesis based 
on realism, two critical conditions for normative entrapment as provided by theory, and one based on 
political framing and group identity. The causal relationship between the variables is therefore 
established. 
 The third kind concerns the generalisation of empirical findings. However, because purposive 
sampling is “a non-probability sampling approach” the result from the analysis cannot be generalised to 
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a population (Bryman, 2012: 418). Furthermore, the findings of this case may not fit other cases with 
different situations, interests, and pressures. However, this thesis does not try to provide an all-
encompassing answer, nor does it offer an explanation that can be used to predict future outcomes of 
EU integrated decision-making. As Eriksen said “reasons may explain action, but they cannot predict 
it” (2013: 2). It does nevertheless try to provide evidence for the plausibility of normative entrapment 
causing the EUMS to sometimes act against their (material) interests. With more empirical research on 
other and different cases, more evidence for normative entrapment might follow, and scientific 
knowledge about decision-making within institutionalised intergovernmental organisations and 
institutions would be enlarged.  
 Finally, ecological validity questions whether the conclusions resulting from the data reflect real 
life or if they are just theoretical. Normative entrapment is hard to ecologically validify in this thesis, 
but by examining the effect of the economic sanctions, this thesis tries to proof that they were not a 
costless compromise caused by hard-bargaining. Therefore, the decision to consent was against German 
and Italian (material) interests, which would imply they were coerced. This thesis argues in favour of a 
normative framework trapping them and forcing them to choose a logic of appropriateness over a logic 
of consequences. Nevertheless, because of the limited scope it cannot rule out other explanations like 
reciprocity, log-rolling, and external pressure changing EUMS’ attitudes towards economic sanctions.  
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3. Case  
3.1 Timeline 
The current tensions between the EU and Russia are not taking place inside a vacuum. The Ukraine-
crisis is rooted in a post-Communist history of EU-Russian relations (Haukkala, 2016: 653). One of the 
key factors in this relationship is identity, both the EU’s and Russia’s. The Russian political and state 
identity still rests in part on the former U.S.S.R., while the EU has institutionalised its CFSP and its 
visibility on the international stage. As identities change, so did the relationship. 
 In the 1990’s cooperation was the main concept. This was exemplified by the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 in which not only economic cooperation between the EU and 
the new post-Soviet Russian state, but also norms and values were enclosed. Common interests and even 
political values were stressed on both sides. This dynamic changed, according to scholars like 
Mearsheimer, Howorth, Marten, Sakwa, Schmidt-Felzmann, and Orenstein and Kelemen, because of 
the increasing external presence of the EU, especially in the former Soviet sphere of influence, an area 
that Russia considered to be ‘their neighbourhood’. 
From the Russian perspective, an encroaching EU promoted its normative versus Russian 
values, which damaged Russian influence. Especially after the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, 
during which the presidential election was dominated by a pro-East and pro-west narrative, when the 
pro-EU Yuschenko won, Russia saw this as EU interference and they began to see them as a hostile 
actor. Other important factors in the deteriorating relationship that antagonised Russia were the 2004 
Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the 2008 Eastern Partnership (EaP) agreement with 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova (Howorth, 2017: 127; Kazharski and 
Makarychev, 2015: 332).  
Russia, which viewed “the expansion of European norms and trade into the former Soviet space 
or former eastern bloc as a direct threat to its security” (House of Lords A, 20-02-2015:23), responded 
to these policies by creating the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as an alternative integration 
mechanism to counter the EU’s influence in their neighbourhood (Howorth, 2017: 127; Orenstein and 
Kelemen, 2017: 90-91; Haukkala, 2016: 656). Additionally, it was made incompatible with the EU 
agreements so that countries would have to choose. Since many eastern European countries had strong 
economic bonds and were therefore dependent on Russia, this meant that choosing the EU would be 
very painful economically. 
Nevertheless, The EC thought the EaP could be “pursued in parallel” with EU-Russian relations. 
Something which the Polish foreign minister, Radowslaw Sikorski in 2014 considered “not exactly a 
success” (Carnegie Europe, 12-05-2014: 1). He stated that the EU and the EUMS “were radically 
overestimating our attractiveness to the neighbours of Europe. We thought that our soft power and our 
economic attractiveness trumps all other considerations” (Carnegie Europe, 2014: 2).  
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Several scholars also argued that the promotion of democracy and free markets was a direct 
challenge to Russian power and control over its neighbouring countries (Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017: 
91; Howorth, 2017: 127; Marten, 2015: 189; Sakwa, 2015: 354; Mearsheimer, 2014: 8; Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2014). Russia feared that closer alignment or integration of Ukraine with “European 
economic and even political structures [was] ultimately […] a stalking horse for Ukraine’s eventual 
NATO membership” (House of Lords A, 20-02-2015: 21), while Ukraine was considered part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence, not only economically, politically, and strategically, but also culturally, 
religiously, and historically (House of Lords A, 20-02-2015: 21). Closer European-Ukrainian bonds 
posed, in the eyes of Russia, not only a geopolitical threat, but also an attack on their identity. The 
Ukraine crisis should therefore be perceived, in part, as a clash of identities between a post-Soviet 
Russian identity of sovereignty, geopolitics and zero-sum logic, and a post-Lisbon EU of international 
norms, values, and principles (Haukkala, 2016: 654; Kazharski and Makarychev, 2015: 328-329, 332). 
Pressured to make a zero-sum choice, the president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to 
sign the association agreement with the EU at the summit in Vilnius in November 2013. This led to 
massive protests in the capital Kyiv and (mostly) in the western half of Ukraine (BBC, 18-02-2015). 
Within three months, the Euromaidan protests resulted in the ousting of the president on February 22nd 
2014.  
Nevertheless, the EU-Russian relations were still at a ‘normal level’ and the EU-Russia summit 
took place as planned on January 28th 2014. Russia was called a strategic partner, and there was talk of 
further cooperation (EUCO 27/14, 2). Nevertheless, Herman van Rompuy pointed out the differences 
between them and explicitly called for “[t]he respect for sovereign countries’ freedom of choice on 
foreign policy, regional economic cooperation and trade” (EUCO, 27/14,2).  
However, after Yanukovych fled Ukraine and anti-revolution protests began in the more pro-
Russian eastern and southern parts of the country, the relationship worsened. Russian president Vladimir 
Putin described Euromaidan as a coup d’état and stepped up rhetoric with criticism of western 
involvement in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. Additionally, starting on February 26th “green men” moved 
into the Crimean Peninsula and by the 27th the Crimean parliament building was seized. Russian flags 
were raised, and a new pro-Russian government announced a referendum on independence from Ukraine 
and integration with Russia. An extraordinary FAC meeting was held on March 3rd which took five 
hours. At the end the EUMS condemned “the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces” (Council of the European Union A, 03-03-
2014).  
Le Monde points that it left out the term ‘invasion’, which was preferred by East-European 
members and that the EU was far from unanimity on the threat of sanctions (04-03-2014). Especially 
Poland saw the Russian actions as a threat to its territorial integrity (Carnegie, 2014: 8). When asked 
about the possibility of economic sanctions and the reluctance by some members, foreign minister 
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Sikorski answered “We should be intelligent about which sanctions we pick to apply” (Carnegie, 2014: 
11). 
Some EUMS were concerned that (economic) sanctions would not create a change in Russian 
policy in Ukraine (Natorski and Pomorska, 2017: 58). According to Der Spiegel, Russia had “little 
foreign debt and large currency reserves, giving it a transitional period of at least two years – enough 
time to find new buyers and distribution routes for Russian gas” (May 12th 2014). Also, Russia might 
consider its interests in Ukraine to be more important than backing down over economic sanctions. 
Eastern-Ukraine was of significant importance for the Russian armament industry and delivered airplane 
motors, gear boxes, and rocket equipment to the Russian military. Sanctions which could hurt EUMS 
economies, might therefore have been in vain. Additionally, the EUMS expected that Russia would react 
with measures of their own. EUMS that were already expected to bear a certain amount of costs could 
face potential higher costs than anticipated if Russia decided to implement its own restrictive economic 
measures which they did on August 8th when they announced a ban on agricultural products 
Ec.europa.eu, 05-11-2017; Europa.eu, 2-09-2014). This was not a risk all members were willing to take. 
Because of this reluctance, it was simply agreed that in the “absence of de-escalating steps by 
Russia, the EU shall decide about consequences for bilateral relations between the EU and Russia […] 
and will consider further targeted measures” (Council of the European Union A, 03-03-2014). This 
resulted in the adoption of a three stage sanctions mechanism of diplomatic, restrictive, and economic 
measures, but without criteria for their adoption (Fischer, 2015: 1). In effect, this meant that the 
discussion would be continued and calibrated according to the crisis’ development (le Monde, 04-03-
2014). 
 Table 2 shows a timeline of nine significant events and the FAC, Council, and European Council 
meetings with the agreed upon sanctions. The sanctions-regime’s first phase was limited to diplomatic 
measures, the second phase included individually targeted measures including visa bans and asset 
freezings, while the third phase targeted specific Russian economic and financial sectors.  
Date Event Meetings Sanctions 
21-11-2013 1. Yanukovych suspends 
the signing of the EU 
Association Agreement 
in Vilnius 
20-02-2014 FAC meeting  
22-02-2014 2. Yanukovych ousted from 
power 
  
27/28-02-
2014 
3. Violence in the Crimea   
01-03-2014 4. Russian parliament 
approves the use of force 
in Ukraine 
03-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of FAC 
 
Diplomatic measures: 
- Suspension of 
preparations for G8 
summit 
06-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council 
Restrictive measures: 
- Preparation of individual 
restrictive measures. 
Diplomatic measures: 
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- Suspension of bilateral 
talks with Russia on visa 
matters and the New 
Agreement. 
16-03-2014 5. Crimean referendum 17-03-2014  
FAC meeting 
 
Restrictive measures: 
- Introduction of travel 
bans and asset freezes 
against 21 officials 
responsible for actions 
threatening Ukraine’s 
territorial sovereignty. 
20/21-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council 
Restrictive measures: 
- 12 names added. 
Diplomatic measures: 
- Cancellation of EU-
Russia summit. 
- No regular summits 
between member states 
and Russia. 
7-04/11-05- 
2014 
6. Donetsk and Luhansk 
protests and referenda 
15-04-2014  
FAC meeting 
Restrictive measures: 
- 4 names added. 
12-05-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of FAC 
 
Expansion of sanctions 
criteria: 
- Can now also target 
persons and entities 
associated with 
destabilising actions. 
- Entities in Crimea and 
Sevastopol which have 
been confiscated. 
Restrictive measures: 
- 13 names added. 
 
23-06-2014 FAC meeting Crimea economic 
sanctions: 
- Ban on import of goods 
from Crimea and 
Sevastopol. 
27-06-2014 7. Signing of EU 
Association Agreement 
with Ukraine 
26/27-06-2014  
Meeting of European Council 
 
Adoption of 4 concrete 
steps that Russia has to 
take by June 30th 2014. 
 
16-07-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council 
Restrictive measures: 
- New list of entities and 
persons established by 
the end of July. 
- Suspension of new 
financing operations by 
EIB and member states. 
17-07-2014 8. Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17 shot down over 
eastern Ukraine 
18-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council 
 
Widening of legal basis for 
restrictive measures: 
- Possible to target entities 
which materially or 
financially support 
actions against Ukraine. 
 
22-07-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of FAC 
 
Restrictive measures: 
- New list implemented 
immediately. 
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Table 2 Timeline of key events and EU meetings (Consilium.europa.eu Timeline, FAC conclusions, and 
other EU documents) 
 
3.2 Economic sanctions 
There has been rich literature on sanctions and in the article Sanctions and the future of EU-Russian 
Economic Relations, Tatiana Romanova dealt with several of them. The first notion amongst scholars is 
that sanctions (especially against authoritarian regimes) often do not work. Studies have demonstrated 
that sanctions barely affect the elite and their calculations, lead to a ‘rally round the flag’ mood in the 
population of the targeted country, rarely lead to big policy changes, and make the most disadvantaged 
part of the population suffer (Romanova, 2016: 775). Another notion is that sanctions often bring 
substantial economic losses, not only to the targeted country, but also to those who do the sanctioning 
(Romanova, 2016: 775).  
 To spread potential economic costs evenly, the design of the sanctions had to reflect political 
and diplomatic requirements. They had to target different sectors, which was difficult, because some 
countries were more dependent on Russian gas or the Russian economy than others. The third stage of 
EU sanctions was therefore a combination between economic and financial measures, did not target 
existing contracts, and did not include energy imports and exports. This means only a small part of the 
EU’s total export to Russia was subject to the sanction regime: credit flows and the export of high-tech 
goods for oil drilling, exploration, energy production, and the military (Romanova, 2016: 774).  
 EU nationals and companies were no longer allowed to loan, buy or sell new bonds, equity or 
similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days to five major Russian banks (Sverbank, 
VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank, and Rosselkhozbank) and their majority-owned 
subsidiaries established outside the EU, three Russian energy companies’ (Rosneft, Transeft, and 
Gazprom Neft) and three major Russian defence companies’ (OPK Oboronprom, United Aircraft 
Corporation, and Uralvagonzavod) (Ökvist, 2016: 3-4, europarl.europa.eu, October 2015). In the 
Preparation of economic 
measures. 
 
25-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council  
Restrictive measures: 
- 15 names and 18 entities 
added. 
Discussion of preparations 
of economic measures.  
29/31-07-
2014 
9. EU economic sanctions 
against Russia approved 
unanimously 
29/31-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council 
Economic sanctions: 
- Restrict Russia’s access 
to EU capital markets. 
- Embargo on import and 
export of arms. 
- Prohibited exports of 
dual use goods and 
technology for military 
use. 
- Need for authorisation to 
export energy-related 
equipment. 
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financial area, the European Council requested the EIB on July 16th 2014 to suspend the signature of 
new financing operations in the Russian Federation, thereby restricting Russia’s access to EU capital 
markets (Fritz, Christen, Sinabell and Hinz, 2017: 4). Also EUMS had to coordinate positions with a 
view to suspend financing of new operations in Russia (Eeas.europa.eu, 16-03-2017). Additionally, the 
sanctions prohibit the export of arms to Russia and the export of material and technology for the 
exploration and production of oil in deep water, the arctic, and shale oil (Eeas.europa.eu, 16-03-2017). 
Furthermore, sanctions were also implemented against the Crimea. Commodities that are 
produced there cannot be imported to the EU, except if a Ukrainian certificate legitimises them. 
Furthermore, no goods, technology, brokering, engineering services can be exported to the peninsula 
and tourism is prohibited (Ökvist, 2016: 4).  
 Russia responded on August 8th 2014 with an import ban on agri-food goods from countries that 
imposed sanctions on Russia. This import ban includes beef and pork, poultry and poultry products, 
smoked foodstuffs and sausages, milk and milk products, as well as fish, vegetables, and fruits (Fritz et 
al, 2017: 4). These sanctions are quite substantial with Russia being the second-most important export 
market for EU agri-food; and with a share of 7,7% in total EU exports in 2013, the fourth largest after 
the USA, Switzerland, and China. Nevertheless, the EU accounted for 42,4% of Russian exports making 
the trade relationship asymmetrical, i.e. the measures would probably hurt Russia more than it would 
the EU (Fritz et al, 2017: 6, Havlik, 2014: 5).  
 
3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP is laid down in the European Treaties (Portela: 2016: 36) and 
was re-acknowledged in the Lisbon Treaty of December 1st 2009 (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011: 1097). 
This new treaty included several declarations that underlined the provisions in the TEU that the foreign 
responsibilities of the EUMS would not be affected and that they would remain in charge of the 
formulation and conduct of their own foreign policies (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 255). Nevertheless, it also 
stresses that the EU and its member states “will remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations1 and […] the responsibility […] of its Members for the maintenance of international 
peace and security” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007: 255). Additionally, EUMS are expected that they “shall 
ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions” (TEU, 33), adhere to the Helsinki 
Accords, and the Charter of Paris (TEU, 33). These international laws, morals, norms, values, and 
principles were co-shaped by the EUMS as signatories to the treaties and as members of the EU. The 
normative framework, as laid down in these documents,  is much their own as it is the EU’s. 
                                                             
1 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations” (UN Charter, Article 2).  
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 The UN Charter states the following main principles: 1) maintain international peace and 
security, 2) peaceful settlements to international disputes, 3) the sovereign equality of all states, 4) the 
obligation to act in accordance with the UN Charter, and 5) refrain from the threat or use of force against 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. It’s main instrumental perception of causal 
relationships is that these value- and rights-based norms can be achieved through international 
cooperation (UN Charter, 3). 
 The Helsinki Accord and the Charter of Paris include the following principles: 1) the sovereign 
equality of states, 2) refraining from the threat or use of force, 3) the inviolability of frontiers, 4) the 
territorial integrity of states, 5) the peaceful settlement of disputes, 6) the non-intervention in internal 
affairs, 7) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 8) respect for equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and 9) adhere to international law, which is also accomplished through the 
instrumental idea of cooperation among states (Helsinki final act, 1975: 4-8; Charter of Paris, 1990: 3-
14). So in effect the EUMS are somewhat limited in what they can do on their own.  
Because the EUMS are responsible for the creation and conduct of foreign policy, most policies 
adopted under the CFSP thus require unanimous support and are subject to a veto by all members 
(Thomas, 2009: 341). Only in specific circumstances is qualified majority voting (QMV) required (TEU, 
325-326). Nevertheless, even QMV is subjected to a veto when “a member of the Council declares that, 
for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken 
by qualified majority” (TEU, 326).  
Nevertheless, the EU does coordinate its external relations and a High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) was created in the Lisbon Treaty. The High 
Representative also oversees the European External Action Service (EEAS), which assists the CFSP 
and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in preparing decisions to be adopted by the Commission or the 
Council of the European Union (TEU, 32).  
Coordination of the EU’s external relations is based on a normative framework which has been 
laid down in the European Treaties. Title V of the TEU deals with these general provisions of the CFSP 
and EU external actions. It prescribes that the EU: 
 
“shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, 
the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law” (TEU, 28).  
 
These values are presented as the values that the Union is meant to defend internationally. The EU’s 
involvement in international conflict resolution is therefore guided by these values (Larsen, 2004: 73).  
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Furthermore, article 2 states that the EU will use common policies to “safeguard its values, 
fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity” as well as “support democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the principles of international law […] preserve peace, prevent conflicts and 
strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter” and “assist […] countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters” (TEU, 29). 
This shall be done in unity, consistency, and with effectiveness of action (TEU, 31).  
When international developments are considered threatening or of significant importance to the 
EU, the President of the European Council has the power to convene an extraordinary meeting in order 
to “define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments” (TEU, 31). Despite 
the general guidelines being defined by the European Council, the actual framing of the CFSP itself is 
decided upon by the Council. 
In case economic, financial or personal restrictive measures are required in the event that the 
EU’s fundamental values are violates, article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) prescribes them (TFEU, 144). It also establishes jurisdictions and processes for 
restrictive measures with regard to the rules established by Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU, i.e. the 
specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (TFEU, 144). 
 
3.3 Germany 
Willy Brandt once said that the goal of German diplomacy is to be “a bridge between Russia and the 
West” (Le Monde, 05-03-2014). On the one hand, Germany has a strong economic and political 
relationship with Russia, but on the other it acknowledges the clear differences of opinion between them. 
Germany saw Russia as a partner more than as a rival until the Ukraine crisis (Orenstein and Kelemen, 
2017: 89). Carta and Braghiroli call this the German Ostpolitik of having a balanced and permissive 
position towards Russia (2011: 275). After the Angela Merkel’s CDU victory over the SPD’s chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder, the relationship cooled off a bit, but has remained important. For instance, Merkel 
has continued the Nord Stream pipeline, but did set up a German-Polish group to discuss the question 
(Le Gloannec, 2009: 65; COM (2014) 330, 28-05-2014). 
This attitude was visible during the Ukraine crisis, in that even when the sanction regime was 
discussed in Brussels on March 6th, Sigmar Gabriel, German minister of Economy visited Russia to 
discuss energy policy and economic development (Le Monde, 05-03-2014). For Russia, Germany was 
also an important partner and a “considerable resource for advancing Russia’s national interests in 
European and world affairs” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 18-02-2013). Prior to the Ukraine 
crisis, Germany invested significantly in Russian infrastructure and industries (Orenstein and Kelemen, 
2017: 96). A positive German-Russian relationship was of great importance to Germany and they 
wanted to improve this despite the differences between them (Auswärtiges Amt, 14-02-2014).  
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This relationship has sometimes been perceived as threatening by other EUMS. They accused 
Germany of putting its own interests above those of their partners (Whist, 2009: 76). The Nord Stream 
pipeline for instance, has been in operation since 2011 and another one was scheduled to be built. It 
ensures that Germany will continue to receive Russian natural gas, since it bypasses ‘difficult transit 
countries’ such as Ukraine (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011: 586). In 2012 this made Germany dependent on 
Russia for 36% of its total gas imports and 37% for its oil imports (IEA, 2014: 205, 210; Schubert, 
Pollak and Brutschin, 2014: 3). 
 In 2013, Germany was Russia’s largest EU trading partner with an economic flow of $77 billion 
(Open Europe, 2015). German exports to Russia in 2013 accounted for €36 billion, that is just 3,3% of 
the total German export in 2013, and the import from Russia was €40 billion, which is 4,5% of the total 
German import in 2013 (DESTATIS, 2014: 414). Furthermore, at the end of 2013 German banks had 
almost €20 billion in claims on Russia (The Economist, 03-05-2014). Despite the large economic flow 
between the two countries though, Russia was not in Germany’s top 5 trading partners. 
 Finally, public opinion in Germany was assessed by a GMF report on transatlantic trends. It 
noted that in Germany, 43% of the respondents had a favourable view of Ukraine and 45% unfavourable 
(GMF, 2014: 50). Nevertheless, a majority of 65 against 32% favoured providing economic and political 
support to Ukraine, even if it would lead to conflict with Russia (GMF, 2014: 51). German public 
opinion was thus favourable to Ukraine.  
 Based on Carta and Braghiroli’s method of looking at the strength of economic flows, the 
existence of disputes, the security perspective, energy dependency, and energy projects, the initial 
position of Germany can be established on a sound theoretical basis.  
 
Strength of 
economic ties 
Energy 
dependence 
Energy projects National security 
perception 
Presence of 
disputes 
0,66 1 1 0 0 
Table 3 German score  
 
Considering, RFS = (indicator 1 + indicator 2 + indicator 3 + indicator 5) / number of indicators, we get: 
RFS=2,66/5  0,532. Germany is thus categorised as a normative malleable country towards Russia, 
which means that they have overall significant economic exchanges or energy dependencies and a 
willingness to cooperate with Russia, but have significant concerns over differences. 
 
3.4 Italy 
Italy also has significant economic and political interests in Russia, amounting to $34,3 billion in the 
first half of 2014 (CBI, 29-10-2014). Italy was therefore Russia’s third-largest trading partner in the EU. 
Additionally, Italian banks had claims in Russia a little under $30 billion (The Economist, 03-05-2014), 
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and the Italian Energy Compani (ENI) had just made a deal with Russia’s Gazprom to build a South 
Stream pipeline. While Italy is not too dependent on Russia for energy (around 30% according to data 
from Open Europe, 2014), it is one of Europe’s largest importers of Russian gas in absolute terms (COM 
(2014) 330, 28-05-2014). Italy has therefore taken “a rather soft position towards Russia” from the start 
(House of Lords A, 20-02-2015: 9).  
 This is supported by the Financial Times, which called Italian foreign minister Frederica 
Mogherini the most vocal proponent of not rushing into sanctions. Italy wanted to avoid setting a trigger 
for punitive measures and argued instead in favour of helping Ukraine securing a peace deal through 
negotiations. Establishing economic sanctions would “raise the political temperature” (Financial Times, 
27-06-2014) and not help in strengthening the dialogue with Russia, which was a prominent concern of 
Italy’s EU presidency (25-11-2013; 06-05-2014; 12-06-2014). 
 Italy was also engaged in the South Stream project in order to further diversify their sources of 
import and ensure energy security. ENI was directly involved in building the underwater section of the 
pipeline, but other economic opportunities were plenty. Italy also perceived the project as a base to 
further strengthen the dialogue between the EU and Russia (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 24-11-2013). 
ENI has been very active in the Italian-Russian relationship (Le Gloannec, 2009: 65; Orenstein 
and Kelemen, 2017: 97; Kuzio, 2017: 111). This among other reasons explains why Italy is defined by 
Russia as a “strategic partner” (Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017: 92; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 
18-02-2013; Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 269; Leonard and Popescu, 2007: 2). Italy has diversified its 
gas imports, but still Russian gas imports amount to 28% of the total in 2012, and oil to 16% (IEA, 2014: 
262, 268). These numbers are significant, but Italy has a large strategic stockpile and is well connected 
with the central European grid (Tsakaris, 2015: 215). Therefore, it is not in the field of energy that Italy 
is close or dependent on Russia.  
Multiple Italian governments favoured strong political and economic ties with Russia. 
Especially prime minister Silvio Berlusconi stressed his friendship with Putin and proved to be a loyal 
Russian ally (Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017: 93; Le Gloannec, 2009: 63; Carta and Braghiroli, 2011: 
275; Kuzio, 2017: 111). Economic and trade ties were also extensive, but nevertheless Italy was not too 
dependent on the Russian economy. According to the WITS, Russia’s share of Italy’s total import in 
2013 was 5,59%, which made Russia Italy’s 5th largest import trading partner (WITS, Italy Product 
Imports by Country 2013). Italy exported less to Russia though, as number 8 Russia made up just 2,76% 
of the total destination market for Italian products and services (WITS, Italy Product Exports by Country 
2013). In absolute terms Russia was thus an important trading partner and Italian firms with “deep and 
longstanding ties to Russia”, have publicly lobbied against more broad-based economic sanctions 
instead of appealing directly to the government (Financial Times, 13-07-2014). The Italian government 
was well aware of the exposure of the Italian economy towards Russia and it had no interest in letting 
the sanctions escalate. 
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We also see this in the GMF report on transatlantic trends, which noted that Italy’s population 
had one of the lowest favourable ratings of Ukraine. 50% of respondents had an unfavourable opinion 
(GMF, 2014: 50). Italy’s respondents were however in majority (52-39%) for providing economic and 
political support to Ukraine, even if it would cause conflict with Russia (GMF, 2014: 51). The Russians 
also lobbied Italian public opinion. According to the Financial Times, Vladimir Dimitriev, a Russian 
banker close to Putin, warned that sanctions against Russia could cost Italy at least €10 billion, a figure 
that could become higher due to retaliation from Russia (Financial Times, 13-07-2014). 
 Based on Carta and Braghiroli’s method it therefore becomes clear that Italy scores higher than 
Germany on the Russian friendliness index. 
 
 
Strength of 
economic ties 
Energy 
dependence 
Energy projects National security 
perception 
Presence of 
disputes 
1 1 1 0 0 
Table 4 Italian score  
 
Considering, RFS = (indicator 1 + indicator 2 + indicator 3 + indicator 5) / number of indicators, we get: 
RFS=3/5  0,6. Italy’s score is thus higher than Germany’s, despite being also categorised as a 
normative malleable country towards Russia. This indicates a willingness to put business over 
differences and a certain friendliness attitude towards Russia. 
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4. Analysis 
 
4.1 The sanction’s effects 
H1: The economic sanctions have had a significant effect on Russia and on the EUMS’ economies. 
It is difficult to estimate the effect and impact of the economic sanctions on Russia, because at the same 
time the oil price, which is a major source of income for the Russian government, dropped significantly 
(Fritz et al, 2017: 4; Romanova, 2015: 781). 2014 nevertheless proved to be a damaging year for the 
Russian economy. GDP growth slowed to 0,7% and the rouble massively depreciated against the US 
dollars (USD). The rate of inflation increased substantially, and capital flew out of the country (Fritz et 
al, 2017: 5). In addition to the decreasing oil revenues, the EU sanctions restricted Russia’s access to 
the EU’s financial markets, and the Russian counter-measures restricted EU exports of agri-food to 
Russia. These measures amplified the effects of the lower oil price by reducing the availability of capital 
and thus limiting investments (Fritz et al, 2017: 13-14). An example of this is that Russian commercial 
real-estate used to be priced in USD, but that market has shifted to be priced in roubles, because of the 
limited possibilities Russian banks had to refinance their operations in USD. (Ökvist, 2016: 5). 
 In the period 2013-2016, the German and Italian economies suffered the largest export losses in 
absolute terms of the EU and their average percentage loss in exports to Russia was more than 20,7% 
(Fritz et al, 2017: 7, 9). In that same period, EU agri-food exports to Russia, which amounted to 9,7% 
of the total trade flows, declined by 2,2% (Fritz et al, 2017: 10-11). The decline in EU exports to Russia 
is the most significant impact related to the economic sanctions. However, this is an insufficient 
indicator for the effects for two reasons. 
 First, total economic costs need to include the negative spillover effects on firms which are part 
of the supply chain for other companies/sectors that export to Russia. These cannot be observed directly, 
but can be estimated by academic models. Releases by the EP, EU Observer, and the EC put the overall 
costs of the sanctions and countersanctions at €40 billion (0,3% of EU GDP) in 2014 and €50 billion 
(0,4%) in 2015 (EU Observer, 28-07-2014). Another study by Havlik of the Wiener Institut für 
Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, predicts a loss for Russia of €20 billion in 2014 and more than €30 
billion in 2015, while estimating a loss for the EU between €11 - €55 billion (Havlik, 2014: 9). The 
Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) even calculated that the EU’s economy could 
lose up to €100 billion and 2 million jobs, including 465.000 German and 215.000 Italian (Eigendorf, 
Maisch, Steiner and Tauber, 19-06-2015). 
 Second, a decline of EU exports does not compare to the total economic costs of the economic 
sanctions, because exporting companies and governments might have adapted their strategies by seeking 
alternative destination markets. This might mitigate the estimated economic losses caused by the 
sanctions (Fritz et al, 2017: 13).  
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  Based on this, the report by Fritz et al calculates that the EU’s export losses are around $7,9 
billion in 2014, $12,9 billion in 2015, and $13,9 billion in 2016 (Fritz et al, 2017: 33). Germany was hit 
the hardest in absolute terms with a loss of $13 billion between 2014-2016, which is a 13% decrease in 
export to Russia, while Italy’s economy in the same period took only $200 million in damage, a 0,7% 
decrease in total export. Interestingly though, there appears to be little to no circumvention of the 
sanctions since the trade flows from the EU to EEU countries other than Russia has decreased over time 
(Fritz et al, 2017: 34-35). 
 Additionally, the Russian embargo caused the EU’s agri-food export to Russia to fall from $15,5 
billion to $6 billion between 2013-2016 (Fritz et al, 2017: 17-18). In 2014, it was still expected that 
around €5,1 billion would be hit out of a total agri-food export to Russia of €11,8 billion, with Germany 
losing €589 million and Italy €163 million (Europa.eu, 3-09-2014). For Germany and Italy though, the 
Russian market accounted for less than 5% of their overall agri-food exports, so this did not hurt them 
too much. Nevertheless, finding alternative destinations for agricultural products took time and was thus 
overall less profitable, thereby leading to a loss of income. The EU tried to counter this through the 
Common Agricultural Policy, i.e. monitoring the affected markets and taking emergency measures, like 
covering storage costs of relevant products, help stabilise unstable farm incomes, and exploring 
alternative sales opportunities (Fritz et al, 2017: 25).  
 The possibility of governments and companies exporting agri-food through Serbia, Belarus, and 
other third countries that were not affected by the sanctions (Romanova, 2015: 791), was also looked at 
by Fritz et al. Agri-food exports from Serbia and Belarus to Russia increased by 13% between August 
and December 2014. Yet only a small part of this increased export consisted of banned goods. Between 
the 4th quarter of 2014 and the first half of 2015 exports from the EU to these countries went up. Russia 
however reinforced their control over inflows of embargoed products through third countries and the 
exports of banned goods through third countries halted (Fritz et al, 2017: 26-27). Several officials, like 
the Austrian chamber of commerce in Serbia, concluded that the circumvention can therefore not be 
ruled out completely, but that it was of limited relevance and did “not seriously thwart the effectiveness 
of the sanctions in place” (Fritz et al, 2017: 27).  
However, because of the state of the Russian economy before the Ukraine crisis (Havlik, 2014: 
1), the decreasing price of oil, the diversification of trade, the circumventing of legal trade restrictions, 
the lack of investment, wide ranging production chains, and most important the severe deterioration of 
the business climate between the EU and Russia driving away investors, it remains difficult to determine 
the specific effects of the EU’s economic sanctions on the Russian and EUMS economies with certainty.  
 Hence, just a few observations can be made: 1) EU exports to Russia have declined significantly 
between 2013 and 2016, 2) trade diversion has mitigated the economic costs of the sanctions only to a 
very limited extent, 3) there was an initial attempt to circumvent the sanctions through Serbia, Belarus 
and others, but Russia reinforced control of the import from third countries, 4) the economic losses for 
the EU amount in the billions of euro’s, with Germany bearing most of the costs in absolute terms, and 
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5) the impact on the Russian economy is much bigger than on the EU’s, 8-10% versus 0,2% (Fritz et al, 
2017: 39-41).  
One could therefore argue that, even though it is hard to determine the significance, the sanctions 
(both the EU’s and those of Russia) did have an effect on the Russian economy while also hurting, to 
an extent, the EUMS’ economies. Both sides lost billions of euros. So the effect of the sanctions is real 
despite the difficulty in determining their significance. These economic losses show that the EU and the 
EUMS were prepared to act despite ex ante knowledge that the sanction regime, potential Russian 
counter-measures, and the subsequent effects of the slow-down of the Russian economy would also 
cause harm to their own economies. H1 can therefore be confirmed.  
 Nevertheless, despite the sanctions’ effect Russia still occupies the Crimea and still supports 
proxies in the Donbass. The sanctions did therefore not achieve their goal on changing Russian 
behaviour. On the other hand, Russia might have had bigger plans but behaved more cautiously out of 
fear of provoking a round of more damaging sanctions. Also, Russia did join the Minsk talks in early 
2015, but did not act on its promises to end the destabilisation of Eastern-Ukraine or stop support for 
the rebels. The only goal that the sanctions managed to achieve was to send a signal that the Russian 
actions were not accepted by the EU and the EUMS. This might indicate that the sanctions were not a 
geopolitical strategy, but an expression of identity.  
 
4.2 The EU’s normative framework in the Ukraine crisis 
In the events of 2014, the security of Europe and the EU’s identity was put to the test. The Ukraine crisis 
represented a critical challenge to the EU’s identity and what it, as a political community, stood for. The 
EU had to react with a message which was needed for the Union to maintain a credible image of itself 
internationally and internally as a normative power and a protector of international law and peace. The 
sanctions can be seen as an expression of the EU’s identity as a community of norms, values, and 
principles based in international law.  
In order to send this message, the EU had to legitimise its position and did so by framing the 
crisis during negotiations in the FAC, the Council, and the European Council. The outcomes from these 
meetings were accepted as the official EU position on the crisis. Through a discourse analysis of the 
official conclusions of those meetings, the geopolitical threats and the key norms, values, and principles, 
that were considered to be violated, the EU’s normative framework for the crisis can be determined. For 
a detailed table, see Annex E: official EU discourse. 
By organising the EU’s official discourse into the four discourse categories, the statements can 
be systematically examined for the reasons EUMS could legitimately use to explain and justify their 
national positions. For this, the timeline in figure 1 and the discourse categories in figure 2 are combined 
to categorise EU discourse on the Ukraine crisis from S1 till S9 (table 5).  
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These nine stages are important, because, as stated previously, the crisis had no stable identity, 
but changed and developed. New events can change the perception of its political, military, economic, 
social, or financial threat by external observers and subsequently their identification of the problem and 
alternative policy options. Developments in the Ukraine crisis made it necessary for the EU to adjust its 
discourse to include certain norms that were violated, while some norms were excluded, because they 
were no longer applicable.  
 
Timeline Institutional Geopolitical Legal Cultural 
1. Yanukovych 
suspends the 
signing of 
the EU 
Association 
Agreement 
in Vilnius 
  - Non-use of force 
- Respect for 
human rights 
- Respect for 
fundamental 
freedoms. 
- Engage in 
dialogue 
 
2. Yanukovych 
ousted from 
power 
    
3. Violence in 
the Crimea 
    
4. Russian 
parliament 
approves the 
use of force 
in Ukraine 
 - Energy 
- Destabilisation 
- Security 
- - Sovereignty 
- Territorial 
integrity 
- Respect 
(international) law 
and agreements 
- Independence 
- De-escalation 
- Free and fair 
elections 
- Negotiations 
- Dialogue 
- Russian aggression 
- EU responsibility for 
peace, stability and 
prosperity 
- Choice for 
civilisation 
5. Crimean 
referendum 
 - Destabilisation  - Free and fair 
elections 
- Sovereignty 
- Territorial 
integrity 
- Dialogue 
- De-escalation 
- Self-
determination 
- Non-use of force 
- Respect 
(international) 
law and 
agreements 
- EU responsibility for 
peace, stability and 
prosperity 
6. Donetsk and 
Luhansk 
protests and 
referenda 
- Respect EU 
Treaties 
- Consistency 
- Coherence 
- Cooperation 
- Common 
vision 
- Energy - Non-use of force 
- Dialogue 
- Unity 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial 
integrity 
- Russian aggression 
- EU positive and 
transformative role 
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Table 5 Categories of EU discourse 
 
It is clear that the EU’s official rhetoric on the Ukraine crisis mainly consists of legal discourse along 
with cultural references. Geopolitical rhetoric, which focuses mostly on the issues of energy security 
and destabilisation of a neighbouring country, is of less importance, while institutional discourse is not 
used much at all, accept during S5 when it re-establishes what behaviour is expected from EUMS when 
they work together. Cultural discourse is used to vilify Russia as an uncivilised state, while describing 
Ukraine’s free choice for Europe as a choice for peace, stability, and prosperity, i.e. a moral Europe. 
The most significant change in the legal discourse happened after S4. While the EU started off 
with mainly value-based norms, it started to include rights-based norms. After the annexation of Crimea, 
references were made to morally independent norms, such as: sovereignty, territorial integrity. Value-
based norms remained present, but started to include those which were also perceived as violated by 
Russian actions, such as: respect for (international) law and agreements to which Russia was a part, 
- Common 
objectives 
 
- Respect 
(international) 
law and 
agreements 
- Negotiations 
7. Signing of 
EU 
Association 
Agreement 
with 
Ukraine 
 - Energy - Non-use of force 
- De-escalation 
- Respect 
(international) 
law and 
agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial 
integrity 
 
8. Malaysia 
Airlines 
flight MH17 
shot down 
over eastern 
Ukraine 
  - Non-use of force 
- Respect for 
human rights 
- Respect for 
fundamental 
freedoms 
- Respect 
(international) 
law and 
agreements 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiation 
- Civilisation 
9. EU 
economic 
sanctions 
against 
Russia 
approved 
unanimously 
  - Non-use of force 
- Respect 
(international) 
law and 
agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial 
integrity 
- Respect for 
human rights 
- Dialogue 
- EU responsibility for 
peace, stability and 
prosperity 
 
- EU positive and 
transformative role 
- Russian aggression 
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independence, the non-use of force, and the need for dialogue and negotiations. This is related to 
developments in the Ukraine crisis, namely the Russian approval for the use of force in Ukraine. This 
Russian decision is considered a violation of international law and of several agreements, such as the 
Helsinki Accords and the Charter of Paris. Additionally, after S5, the Crimean referendum, legal 
discourse also includes the violations of Ukrainian national law. Between S4 and S9, the legal discourse 
remains centred around this normative. 
The Union could only be credible if it acted on its moral standards. Inaction would mean that 
the EU would leave its principles, values and policies behind, thereby making inaction costlier than the 
potential costs of action. Principles therefore dominated the discourse over geopolitical concerns.  
 
4.3 German and Italian statements on the Ukraine crisis 
4.3.1 Germany 
Statements from the Auswärtiges Amt made in reference to Ukraine, the Ukraine crisis, and Russia 
(Annex A) have been categorised into institutional, geopolitical, legal, and cultural discourse (see Annex 
B). Their shares of the total amount of statements is presented in figure 5.  
What is clear is that German statements mostly contain legal discourse in the first few stages of 
the Ukraine crisis, while geopolitical and institutional discourse is almost non-existent. This changes 
however during S4, when the Russians approve the use of force in Ukraine and the Crimean referendum 
during S5. Also from S6 onwards, institutional discourse gradually increases its presence in German 
statements. This could be explained by Germany’s changing position in the Ukraine crisis.  
After Germany’s change of heart on tougher sanctions, there is more focus on the behavioural 
expectations of other members. They point out the need for coordination, cooperation, consensus, and 
joint action. This is logical because Germany now has an interest in getting tougher sanctions and it 
needs the other EUMS in order to pass it in the CFSP decision-making process. When Germany was 
still reluctant, it is reasonable that they did not, or refer less, to institutional discourse, because they were 
the ones blocking the tougher sanctions. 
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Figure 5 Germany discourse percentages 
  
German geopolitical discourse does not consider the Ukraine crisis a threat to a specific country, even 
though they accept the validity of Polish and Baltic concerns based on their historical experiences with 
Russia (Auswärtiges Amt: 14-03-2014), but they rather focus on the possibility of a disunited continent, 
i.e. a split Europe, and the issue of instability at Europe’s borders. In the words of Orenstein and 
Kelemen, the Ukraine crisis was considered a “proxy war on the EU” (2017: 95). Furthermore, no 
mentioning has been made on the issue of energy security. This small share of geopolitical discourse 
suggests that these issues, although recognised to some extent, did not play a significant role in 
Germany’s official perception of the Ukraine crisis and was sparsely used in explaining their position. 
 The issue of identity, or cultural discourse, is interesting, because its usage peaks three times at 
S3, S6, and S8. All three stages are characterised by increased violence. First in taking over Crimea, then 
in the Donbass, and finally when MH17 was shot down. The EU is linked to peace, freedom, and 
prosperity, while Russian and separatist actions are considered aggressive, violent, and territorial. The 
group-identity here is associated with values and principles that are considered just and legitimate, while 
the other, being Russia and the separatists, is vilified by linking their actions to what is considered 
illegitimate. 
 Again, with Germany we see little institutional discourse in the first stages of the Ukraine crisis. 
Germany’s statements remain mostly filled with legal rhetoric until the signing of the AA with Ukraine, 
focusing on European norms and values like non-violence, the need for dialogue and negotiation, and 
human rights. Only after the change in the German national position the share of institutional rhetoric 
rises because they want to convince other EUMS to join their preferences. 
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4.3.2 Italy 
 
Figure 6 Italy discourse percentages 
 
The same procedure is applied to the statements from the Italian Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della 
Cooperazione Internazionale made in reference to Ukraine, the Ukraine crisis, and Russia (Annex C). 
These are also categorised into the four discourse categories (see Annex D) and their shares are presented 
in figure 6.  
There is not much cultural discourse present in Italian statements between S1 and S7. It refers 
mainly to the Ukrainian government as responsible for the violence against protesters (20-02-20142). Its 
share remains minimal, focusing mainly on the expectations that Russia will enter negotiations (10-03-
2014; 25-04-2014), until S8 and S9 when MH17 crashed in eastern Ukraine. Then the discourse changes 
more in favour of Ukraine and paints Russia as responsible for the situation that enabled the downing 
of the airplane. Cultural discourse refers to an “abominable act”, Russia’s responsibility to ensure full 
and credible collaboration, and finally its repeated failures and failure to respect official commitments 
(19-07-2014; 29-07-2014)  
 Geopolitical discourse, after a significant presence in S1 and S2, drops to single percentages. It 
limits itself to: 1) the danger of Ukraine exploding and civil war at the border, 2) the importance of 
Russia as a partner for Italy in trade and energy, and 3) the threat of a severe EU reaction to the 
EU/Italian-Russian relationship (24-11-2013; 20-02-2014; 28-01-2014; 10-02-204 (A); 20-02-2014; 23-
05-2014). 
                                                             
2 The colours refer to specific statements as categorised in annexes B and D.  
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 Institutional rhetoric’s share, despite being virtually absent during S1, rises drastically during S2 
and S3, only to lose its importance until S8 and S9. While Italy refers to European unity in word and 
action, calls for communication between EUMS´ foreign ministers, and supports actions by France, 
Germany, and Poland (26-02-2014; 28-02-2014; 01-03-2014; 13-03-2014; 07-05-2014), it argues that 
using the same words and messages to denounce Russian actions and the annexation of Crimea, will not 
be enough to find solutions (19-04-2014). Inviolable principles will remain violated, and red lines and 
ultimatums by the West will not change this. The only solution, Italy argues, is to get Russia and Ukraine 
to talk. 
 Pushing for the need for dialogue, negotiations, and a political solution is at the core of Italian 
legal discourse. They state several times that there is “no true alternative to the resumption of dialogue” 
(19-02-2014). In this, Italy claims to be of the same identity of views on, and share a common reading 
of, the Ukraine crisis with Germany. They argue that German and Italian pushes for the need for dialogue 
softened the “muscular approach that some countries, such as Poland and France, had suggested” (19-
04-2014). Furthermore, it uses words like “unacceptable violence”, “peaceful protests”, unacceptable 
“abuses against the civilian population”, to describe the Ukraine crisis and separatist and Russian 
actions. In between there is also expressed concern that human rights in Ukraine are being violated, first 
by the Ukrainian government, later by the separatists and Russia (10-02-2014B).  
In its push for dialogue, Italy specifically refer to the need to include Russia, which is a major 
partner despite differences (20-02-2014; 25-11-2013). Italian statements refer multiple times in S1 to the 
importance of the EU-Russian relationship, the need to strengthen dialogue, and – remarkably – the 
importance of perceiving Russia as part of the solution, not the problem (24-11-2013; 16-12-2013; 20-
02-2014). This faith that Russia will cooperate with the EU through negotiations and that they will try 
to stop destabilising Ukraine, is present in Italian statements is present at least until S4 (03-03-2014). 
 
4.4 Second hypothesis 
H2: Germany and Italy considered the EU’s identified normative framework to be applicable to the 
Ukraine crisis. 
Relevance is a critical condition for normative entrapment. EU norms that are used as foundation for 
CFSP agreements and joint action must be considered applicable to a situation in order to trap EUMS. 
If a norm does not apply, then the argument for action is illogical leading members to be disentrapped 
and no longer limited in their choosing their own actions. 
 As stated by Eriksen, by determining the EU’s political framing of the crisis before and after 
key events, one can determine if/when its normative reasons were accepted by the EUMS. Through an 
analysis and categorisation of German and Italian discourse on the Ukraine crisis, a systematic 
comparison can be made with the EU’s official discourse per stage of the crisis. This comparison will 
indicate to what extent German and Italian perceptions of the crisis match the European one. If there is 
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a match between used references, then this indicates that both considered the EU’s legal discourse to be 
applicable to the Ukraine crisis, because they used it too.  
 As determined under 4.2, the EU’s statements contained mainly legal discourse to refer to the 
Ukraine crisis. German and Italian statements from the Auswärtiges Amt and the Ministero degli Affari 
Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale must thus be compared with the EU’s legal discourse. In 
Annex B and D both EUMS’ statements have been categorised into institutional, geopolitical, legal, and 
cultural discourse. Those including legal discourse have been analysed, and the referred-to normative 
has been included into tables 6 and 7 to allow for a systematic comparison.  
 
4.4.1 Germany 
Stage EU legal discourse German legal discourse 
S1 - Non-use of force 
- Respect for human rights 
- Respect for fundamental freedoms. 
- Engage in dialogue 
- Self-determination 
- Respect for fundamental freedoms 
- Non-use of force 
- Democracy 
- Political solution 
- Dialogue 
- De-escalation of violence 
S2  - Need for de-escalation 
- Need for political solution 
- Dialogue 
- Preserve territorial integrity 
- Preserve national unity 
- Non-use of force 
S3  - Need for democracy 
- Need for dialogue 
- Need for political solution 
- Support sovereignty 
- Support territorial integrity 
- End violence 
- S4 - - Sovereignty 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Independence 
- De-escalation 
- Free and fair elections 
- Negotiations 
- Dialogue 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Need for political solution 
- Respect sovereignty 
- Respect territorial integrity 
- Respect (international) law 
- Need for dialogue 
- Need for negotiations 
S5 - Free and fair elections 
- Sovereignty 
- Territorial integrity 
- Dialogue 
- De-escalation 
- Self-determination 
- Non-use of force 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Violation of (international) law 
- Dialogue 
- Need for political solution 
- Negotiations 
- Cooperation 
- End violence 
- Violation of territorial integrity 
- Violation of sovereignty 
- Violation of unity 
- De-escalation 
S6 - Non-use of force 
- Dialogue 
- Unity 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Non-use of force 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiations 
- Need to respect outcome of negotiation 
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Table 6 EU-German legal discourse comparison 
 
Table 6 shows that the norms that are referred to by Germany are mostly the same as the EU’s. In S1 
Germany states that it will continue its efforts towards a solution. Steinmeier made clear that he was not 
willing to issue ultimatums and that however difficult the situation is, a political solution was the only 
way forward. Germany states multiple times that violence is not a solution (19-02-2014 (A)). Value-
based norms, like dialogue, negotiations, and self-determination, form the core of German legal 
discourse. Because value-based norms are grounded in the identity, official values, and long-standing 
traditions of a group and are considered fundamental to membership, German references can be 
considered to be in line with the EU.  
 During S2 Germany helped mediate a compromise between parties in Ukraine. Despite criticism 
that the EU was a player in the conflict, Steinmeier said that they had to try to mediate. Furthermore, he 
restated his conviction that sanctions should only be used to help push players to come to a political 
solution (23-02-2014). 
 During S2 and S3 German statements for the first time refer to rights-based norms, such as the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine, the non-use of force, de-escalation, and sovereignty. Violence in the 
Crimea and eastern regions must not lead to a break-up of Ukraine (28-02-2014). In S4 Germany calls 
on Russia to not violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Crimea and calls its actions 
illegal (01-03-2014; 02-03-2014). Nevertheless, Germany’s statements remain dominantly filled by 
value-based norms. Germany states its convictions that it is “important […] to exhaust all, absolutely 
all, options to prevent Ukraine from sliding back into violence” (04-03-2014). In its legal discourse, 
Germany thus uses similar rhetoric to refer to Russian actions as the EU does. 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Negotiations 
- Violation of human rights 
- Need for unity 
- Territorial integrity 
- Sovereignty  
S7 - Non-use of force 
- De-escalation 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial integrity 
- End violence 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiations 
- Need for political solution 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Human rights 
- Violation of territorial integrity 
- Violation of (international) law 
S8 - Non-use of force 
- Respect for human rights 
- Respect for fundamental freedoms 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiation 
- Violation of human rights 
- End violence 
- Violation of territorial integrity 
- Violation of (international) law 
S9 - Non-use of force 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect for human rights 
- Dialogue 
- End violence 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Violation of human rights 
- Dialogue 
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 The comparison reveals that German legal discourse includes both value-based norms and 
rights-based norms, which are the same as the those in the legal discourse of the EU. Because Germany 
used the same rhetoric, this indicates that they considered the EU’s normative framework in reference 
to the Ukraine crisis to be applicable to the situation. For Germany, H2 is therefore confirmed. 
 
4.4.2 Italy 
Stage EU legal discourse Italian legal discourse 
S1 - Non-use of force 
- Respect for human rights 
- Respect for fundamental freedoms. 
- Engage in dialogue 
- Unacceptable violence 
- Peaceful protests 
- Unacceptable abuses against civilians 
- Dialogue 
- Abstaining from violence 
- Democracy 
- Rule of law 
- Freedom of association 
- Freedom of expression 
- Freedom of assembly 
- Free trade 
- Human Rights 
S2   
S3  - - No alternative to dialogue 
- - Concern for territorial integrity 
- S4 - - Sovereignty 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Independence 
- De-escalation 
- Free and fair elections 
- Negotiations 
- Dialogue 
- - Violation of territorial integrity 
- - Need for dialogue 
- - Need for political solution 
- - Violation of sovereignty 
- - Violation of (international) law 
- - Need for de-escalation 
- - Unacceptable violence 
 
S5 - Free and fair elections 
- Sovereignty 
- Territorial integrity 
- Dialogue 
- De-escalation 
- Self-determination 
- Non-use of force 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Violation of (international) law 
- Need for diplomatic solution 
- Need for dialogue 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Need for respecting sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine 
S6 - Non-use of force 
- Dialogue 
- Unity 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Negotiations 
- End violence 
- Need for de-escalation 
- Need for dialogue 
- Need for peaceful solution 
- Respect human rights 
- Violation of (international) law.  
- Need for Ukrainian internal unity 
- Need for responsible actions from all parties 
S7 - Non-use of force 
- De-escalation 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial integrity 
- Need for dialogue 
- Need for negotiations 
- End violence 
- Respect international negotiation outcomes 
S8 - Non-use of force 
- Respect for human rights 
- Respect for fundamental freedoms 
- Respect international negotiation outcomes 
- End violence 
- Need for rigorous and impartial inquest. 
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Table 7 EU-Italian legal discourse comparison 
 
A comparison of EU legal discourse with that of Italy shows that the value-based and rights-based norms 
that are referred to are also mostly the same to those of the EU. From S1 to S6 there is virtually no 
difference. In S1, ‘Unacceptable violence’ and ‘abstaining from violence’’ can be shared under the EU’s: 
‘Non-use of force’. Italian references to peaceful protests’, ‘unacceptable abuses against civilians’, 
‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’, ‘freedom of association’, ‘freedom of expression’, ‘freedom of assembly’, 
‘free trade’, and ‘human rights’ can be linked to the EU’s principles of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Italy also points to the need for dialogue to find a political solution between Ukrainian parties, 
a principle that is also expressed by the EU. These are mainly value-based norms. 
The developments of S4 and S5 bring about a new identification of the Ukraine crisis and Italian 
discourse changes in the same manner as the EU’s, i.e. it includes more rights-based norms. The 
violations of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and (international) law, are denounced, while they call for 
the de-escalation of violence and push for the need of dialogue between Russia and Ukraine to come to 
a diplomatic solution. This does not change during S6. 
Italian legal discourse changes in the latter three stages of this thesis’ timeframe. On April 17th 
2014 there have been negotiations between the US, Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. It becomes increasingly 
clear that Russia does not act according to the agreement. In Italian legal discourse, the references to the 
need for dialogue and negotiations are thus changed or replaced by the call to respect the outcome of 
international agreements. Furthermore, the escalation of violence is denounced by Italy. Unlike the EU, 
Italy does no longer refer to the rights-based violations of territorial integrity and sovereignty. This does 
however not mean that Italy no longer considers the annexation of the Crimea by Russia as a violation, 
but that it focuses on other aspects of the crisis which it considers more urgent at that time.  
Considering the compared legal discourses and the shared references to certain norms and 
values, it can be determined that Italy considered the EU’s legal discourse to be applicable to the Ukraine 
crisis. For Italy, H2 can thus also be confirmed.  
 
 
 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Dialogue 
- Negotiation 
S9 - Non-use of force 
- Respect (international) law and agreements 
- Sovereignty 
- Independence 
- Territorial integrity 
- Respect for human rights 
- Dialogue 
- Respect international negotiation outcomes 
- End violence 
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4.5 Third hypothesis  
The third hypothesis was split into 3A and 3B, the first being: The EU’s identified normative framework 
was considered uncontroversial by Germany and Italy. 
Determinacy was determined to be the second critical condition to make normative entrapment a 
plausible explanation for decision-making within EU institutions. Natorski, Pomorska, Leuffen, 
Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig all stated that the EU’s normative consists of formalised norms and 
values in the EU Treaties, accepted through uncontested identities, or the result of long-standing 
practises.  
 The analysis of FAC, Council, and European Council conclusions and press releases under 4.2. 
identified the EU’s normative framework for action to be mainly in the legal category, i.e. the norms 
and values that are included in the European Treaties. Furthermore, the discourse analyses and 
comparisons of Germany and Italy indicated that both nations considered the norms and values that were 
identified by the EU as a basis for agreement and joint action, to be relevant for the Ukraine crisis.  
 As stated previously, whether norms are considered uncontroversial is established when the 
identified normative framework is laid down in the EU Treaties. The norms and values in the EU’s legal 
discourse regarding the Ukraine crisis, must therefore be compared with those in the Treaties. Those 
that match may be considered uncontroversial, because they have had to be officially ratified and 
accepted by both EUMS.  
 The main legal norms and values that were identified by the EU were: ‘human rights’, 
‘fundamental freedoms’, ‘non-use of force’, ‘respect for (international) law’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial 
integrity’, ‘self-determination’, and ‘dialogue’. The EU Treaties mention the following value-based and 
rights-based norms, values, and behavioural expectations (figure 7): 
 
- EU and member states’ policies are bound by the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which includes: 
o Maintain international peace and security;  
o Peaceful settlements to international disputes; 
o Achieve international cooperation; 
o The sovereign equality of all states; 
o The obligation to act in accordance with the UN Charter;  
o And refrain from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state 
- Member states are responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
- EU and member states’ policies are bound by the Helsinki Accords and the Charter of Paris, 
which include:  
o The sovereign equality of states; 
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Figure 7 Norms and values in the EU Treaties, UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, and Charter of Paris. 
o Refraining from the threat or use of force; 
o  The inviolability of frontiers;  
o The territorial integrity of states; 
o The peaceful settlement of disputes; 
o The non-intervention in internal affairs; 
o Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
o Respect for equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 
o Cooperation among states; 
o Adhere to international law. 
- EU and member states should advance to the wider world the principles of:  
o Democracy; 
o The rule of law; 
o Human rights; 
o Fundamental freedoms; 
o Respect for human dignity; 
o Equality; 
o Solidarity; 
o And respect for the UN Charter and international law. 
- EU common policies should be used to: 
o Safeguard its values; 
o Fundamental interests; 
o Security 
o Independence; 
o and integrity. 
- EU common policies should be used to support: 
o Democracy; 
o The rule of law; 
o Human rights; 
o The principles of international law; 
o Preserve peace; 
o Prevent conflicts; 
o Strengthen international security; 
o And aid countries confronting man-made disasters. 
 
 
Germany and Italy were both signatories of the EU Treaties, the UN Charter, The Helsinki Accords, and 
the Charter of Paris. This means that both countries officially accepted and ratified the norms and values 
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in those treaties. The EU’s identified normative framework, matches perfectly with those represented in 
figure 7. Furthermore, because Germany and Italy accepted the relevance of the EU’s identified norms 
and values and they also used these themselves, the identified normative framework can be considered 
uncontroversial. This means that H3A can be confirmed.  
 Hypothesis 3B states that: The EU’s identified normative framework had no clear behavioural 
implications. The clarity of the behavioural implications is uncertain. The violation of these fundamental 
norms does prescribe disapproval, because violating something upon which all signatories agreed is 
considered illegitimate behaviour, but it does not prescribe or demand that the EUMS should agree to 
and implement economic sanctions against the perpetrators.  
 Both Germany and Italy tried to use the identified normative framework to put forward their 
own visions of what should happen. As states, EUMS use norms to argue in favour of their policy 
preference, or to explain and justify their positions, in a way that is considered legitimate by their peers. 
This way, those states that favour a different policy choice will not be perceived as acting contrary to 
the group’s normative.  
Germany consistently referred to value-based norms, such as the need for diplomacy and 
dialogue, in its statements regarding the Ukraine crisis. In their statements they argued against the 
dangerous consequences of economic sanctions because they were considered harmful in the efforts to 
get Russia to the negotiating table, thereby not ending the violence. Sanctions were only considered to 
be a tool to get Russia to the negotiation table if they were unwilling to change their actions. Steinmeier 
called on Russia to “come to an international agreement” and if no decisive steps were taken then “the 
discussion among leaders in the European Council will indeed lead to measures being taken” (08-07-
2014). German discourse thus argued that punishing the violation of rights-based norms would be 
obstructive to pursuing the EU’s value-based norms. 
 Like Germany, Italy also accepted and used the EU’s official legal discourse, but picked out 
two value-based norms which favoured their preferred choice: ending violence and creating a peaceful 
solution through dialogue. Their argument was, like Germany’s, that economic sanctions would be 
counterproductive in getting Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, because sanctions could drive 
away Russia’s will to come and talk, thereby continuing the violence. They state that “the best way to 
encourage the Moscow and Kiev governments’ responsibility, is to refrain from contributing to 
escalation, even verbally. (10-03-2014). 
Furthermore, they also support this argument by using institutional discourse, referring to 
communication and cooperation. Italy claims several times not to be misaligned with other members 
when they argue in favour of keeping “sanctions and financial assistance outside the existing 
framework” (10-02-2014 (A)). More than once they mention that their position has been discussed with 
Germany, which, according to Italy, is of the same opinion (3-03-2014 B; 19-04-2014). H3B can 
therefore be confirmed. This discord on the behavioural implications means that the EUMS’ turned to a 
logic of arguing. 
 
59 The EU-Russian Sanctions 
 
4.6 Fourth hypothesis 
H4: Accepting the framed identity of Russia as an untrustworthy dialogue partner drove Germany and 
Italy to consent to economic sanctions. 
When behavioural implications of norms are contested, unclear, or contrary to national interests, states 
will not always act in accordance with a logic of appropriateness. They will then turn to a logic of 
arguing, i.e. the justification and explanation of one’s position/action/preferred option by convincing 
others of their logic and legitimacy. 
Aggestam argued that through analysing role expectations and role conceptions, role 
performance could be explained. Role expectation referred to the behavioural expectations of the EU, 
and the EUMS, of its constituents. The official EU discourse (Annex E) was categorised in table 5. 
These conclusions of FAC, Council, and European Council meetings identified which norms and values 
were considered violated by the EU. In the case of Germany and Italy, their arguments against economic 
sanctions were that they would obstruct the possibility of dialogue and negotiations. The fundament 
under these value-based norms is the perception of Russia as a trustworthy partner or at least as an 
important player that is necessary for a political solution. 
Role conception is the expectation that both members themselves had of a unified EU response 
to the Ukraine crisis. Through the friendliness indexes towards Russia, which was based on Carta and 
Braghiroli’s method, the initial positions of both nations towards Russia were determined. Germany 
scored 0,532 and Italy 0,6 on a Russian friendliness index ranged between 0-1. According to Carta and 
Braghiroli, this makes both states normatively malleable towards Russia. Or in other words, countries 
which try to cooperate with Russia and overall have significant economic exchanges or energy 
dependencies.  
Germany and Italy were thus initially positively inclined towards Russia, or at least unwilling 
to harm their good economic/financial/political relationships. As mentioned under 4.5, both EUMS used 
the norms of non-violence and finding peaceful solutions through negotiation, in order to argue against 
economic sanctions. Their argument for negotiation however rested on 1) Russia’s willingness to talk, 
and 2) that Russia would act on its commitments after a possible agreement.  
German and Italian use of the EU’s identified normative framework to argue in favour of their 
own policy preferences, i.e. no economic sanctions, was therefore based on their perception of Russia. 
This means that for the hypothesis to be confirmed, both EUMS’ perceptions of Russia must have 
changed to reflect the EU’s perception of Russia. To establish this, German and Italian cultural discourse 
is analysed and compared with that of the EU. 
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4.6.1 Germany 
Based on annexes A and B, Germany’s cultural discourse with references to Russia and Ukraine has 
been analysed. The results are shown in table 8 in order to determine Germany’s perceptive change of 
Russia.  
 
Stage EU cultural discourse German cultural discourse 
S1  - Ukraine shares our values 
- Ukrainians long for the EU 
- Prosperous and stable future through EU 
partnership 
- Active expression for European Ukraine 
- Those responsible for the bloodshed can be 
targeted by sanctions 
- Ukrainian authorities responsible 
- Need for a common future with Russia 
- Important cultural, historical, political, 
economic relationship with Russia 
- Acceptance of differences with Russia 
- Russia a strategic partner 
- Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s 
desperate economic situation to block the EU 
association agreement is an outrage 
S2  - Russia supported the plan and participated in 
a mediation by Germany 
- Russia is an important, but not an easy partner 
- Legitimate criticism of Russia over its stances 
on the rule of law and human rights 
- Need for dialogue and cooperation with 
Russia 
- Ukraine is part of Europe 
S3   
- S4 - Russian aggression 
- EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
- Choice for civilisation 
- Russian actions are dangerous to Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity 
- Russia has no right to deploy its military in 
Ukraine 
- Russian annexation of Crimea pours oil into 
the fire 
S5 - EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
- EU represents the great promise of peace, 
freedom, and prosperity 
- Strong German-Russian relationship 
- Russia is no partner for stability 
- Law of the strong versus the strength of the 
law 
- One-sided geopolitical interests put before 
agreement and cooperation 
- Russia still an important partner to resolve 
conflicts over neighbouring countries 
- Russia has distanced itself from the path of 
cooperation and law 
- Russian acts of aggression 
- In trying times, people need to care about 
relations between Germany and Russia 
- Not ignore that Russia has a special 
relationship with Ukraine 
S6 - Russian aggression 
- EU positive and transformative role 
- When it comes to further bloodshed and 
deaths, Kyiv and Moscow have a 
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Table 8 EU-German cultural discourse comparison 
 
Germany made clear early on that it considered the European aspirations of the Ukrainians to be 
legitimate and that, despite being unwilling to issue ultimatums, it condemned all forms of violence and 
that the EU had to consider targeted sanctions on individuals who were responsible for the bloodshed 
(18-02-2014). Furthermore, while acknowledging their differences with Russia on the rule of law, 
human rights, or on international situations, Germany referred to the important economic, cultural, 
historical, and political relationship with Russia and the need to build a common future (14-02-2014; 
27-01-2014).  
responsibility to live up to the commitments 
they undertook in Geneva 
- Parading OSCE and Ukrainian prisoners is a 
violation of human rights 
- Russia has an obligation to use its influence 
with the separatists 
- Welcome Russia’s constructive approach 
- Ukrainian elections show European aspirations 
- Shooting down aircraft is a crime and those 
who did it disqualify themselves from taking 
part in dialogue 
- Russia needed for Ukrainian unity 
- We cannot continue our normal relationship 
with Russia after the annexation of the Crimea 
S7  - European values, such as freedom, 
democracy, rule of law, freedom of the press, 
minority rights etc. are the key and guarantee 
for our European model 
- The international order has been severely 
shaken by Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
- Russian actions are absolutely unacceptable 
- Relationship with Russia cannot go back to 
business as normal 
S8 - Civilisation - No one responsible for such an atrocity any 
longer has any right to push for their own 
interests in the name of humanity 
- Heartless conduct of the separatists 
- Shows clearly what kind of people we are 
dealing with 
- Russian unwillingness to cooperate and to be 
responsible is madness 
- Russian power politics 
- Whoever impedes the investigation has 
something to hide or no heart 
- Separatists will not adhere to the most basic 
rules of our civilisation 
- Separatists beyond civilisation 
S9 - EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
 
- EU positive and transformative role 
- Russian aggression 
 
-  
 
62 The EU-Russian Sanctions 
 Interesting is that during S1 German minister Guido Westerwelle, a liberal, was replaced by 
Frank Walter Steinmeier, a social-democrat. Westerwelle clearly denounced Russian actions while 
Steinmeier seemed to focus more on the partnership with Russia despite differences.  
 Still, after Russian actions in the Crimea and it subsequent annexation, Germany responded that 
it would respond if the situation would continue to escalate. It warned however that sanctions were not 
the goal and could be revoked in case of de-escalation (10-03-2014). 
 On March 13th 2014, Merkel gave a policy statement on the situation in Ukraine to the German 
Bundestag. The statement mainly included cultural discourse, focused on portraying Russian actions as 
opposed to modern, international, and European principles of non-violence, territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, cooperation, and agreement. While clearly denouncing Russia and portraying what future 
options would be in case of no deescalating steps were taken, she still called Russia a partner and 
proposed a new economic agreement to solve economic conflicts over neighbouring countries (13-04-
2014). She also recognised Russia’s special relationship with Ukraine, something that was supported 
several times by Steinmeier.  
 
4.6.2 Italy 
Italian cultural discourse has been determined based on the database in annex C and the categorisation 
in annex D. The results have been put in table 9, which makes it possible to determine a change in the 
Italian perception of Russian and Ukrainian actions and Russia as a partner.  
 
Stage EU cultural discourse Italian cultural discourse 
S1  - Russian realpolitik 
- Russia to erase shame of imperial breakdown 
- Human rights as changed from east to west, 
supported by autocracy and financial gain 
- Strengthen dialogue and economic 
relationship with Russia 
- Ukrainian authorities to blame 
S2   
S3   
- S4 - Russian aggression 
- EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
- Choice for civilisation 
- Russian actions unacceptable, but faith in 
Russian statements on the will to maintain a 
sovereign and integrate Ukraine 
S5 - EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
- Moscow has to take a step towards diplomacy 
- Russia must remain a partner to the EU 
- Russia to return to its role of global, 
responsible international partner 
- Russia failed to respect the principles and 
commitments enshrined in the treaties on 
which the NATO-Russia partnership is based 
- Moscow has seriously violated the trust on 
which cooperation must be based 
S6 - Russian aggression 
- EU positive and transformative role 
- Expect Moscow to implement the accords 
- During Italian presidency, make effort to 
rebuild the dialogue between EU and Russia 
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Table 9 EU-Italian cultural discourse comparison 
 
The EU’s cultural references on Russia start during S4., but Italy states much earlier that they have 
differences of opinion with Russia, but that its political and economic relationship is good and must be 
strengthened. Italy’s perception of Russia as a partner is dominant in its cultural statements, even after 
S4 and S5. Italy did denounce the violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and stated 
that Russian actions violated trust, but also mentioned their good faith in Russia based on the statements 
of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, who implied the will to maintain a sovereign Ukraine, and its role 
as an international partner (03-03-2014). Italy remained of the opinion that the EU needed the Russians 
as partners, because there are many other problems in the world that had to be solved. 
Despite the developments in Ukraine, Italy considers stage-2 sanctions sufficient. They state 
that stage-3 sanctions would only be agreed-upon when further steps were taken to destabilise Ukraine. 
Italian foreign minister Mogherini even warned that economic sanctions would mean the failure of 
Europe’s diplomatic strategy (05-04-2014). Later that month, Italy recognised the deterioration of the 
- Political relations were strong and remain 
strong, though governments have changed 
- Italian presidency to bring cooperation with 
Russia on a constructive basis 
- Mistrust of Italian economic operators in 
Russia  
- Russia not as a factor of instability, but as a 
factor of responsibility 
- The problem is inside Ukraine, not only with 
Russia 
- Cold war is in the rhetoric 
- Solve crisis with, and not against Russia 
S7  - Russian complete willingness to work on a 
ceasefire 
- Italian presidency to contribute to eliminating 
the barriers between the EU and Russia 
S8 - Civilisation - Bringing down MH17 is an abominable act 
- Russia must ensure full and credible 
collaboration 
- Fully aware of the pain Ukraine has long been 
enduring 
- Russia had been publically willing to 
negotiate, but have not backed that pledge with 
concrete actions 
- Russian inconsistency between declared 
intentions and concrete deeds 
- Russia must use influence to ensure ceasefire, 
access to crash area, and a reliable inquest 
- Ukraine has taken difficult path towards 
political stabilisation 
- Ukraine has reformed, complied with Geneva 
accord, and provided peace plans 
S9 - EU responsibility for peace, stability and 
prosperity 
 
- EU positive and transformative role 
- Russian aggression 
 
- Russia’s failure to collaborate 
- Russia’s failure to respect the commitments it 
made officially 
 
64 The EU-Russian Sanctions 
situation in Ukraine, but still wanted no economic sanctions instead supporting an expansion of the 
already existing stage-2 sanctions, i.e. targeted sanctions (25-04-2014). Also Italy retained its goals of 
strengthening cooperation with Russia during its EU presidency and maintained that the crisis had to be 
solved with, and not against, Russia.  
The EU’s transformative role and its responsibilities are not mentioned by Italy. Furthermore, 
they did not refer to the EU as civilised versus a barbaric Russia. Italy’s cultural discourse remained 
limited to portraying Russia as a partner in solving the crisis, as a future economic and political partner, 
and acceptance of the differences. Their references to sanctions therefore underlined that they should 
only be used to get all parties to sit down and talk (25-05-2014; 03-06-2014; 04-06-2014).  
 
4.5.3 Changing positions 
Germany’s and Italy’s Russian friendliness index indicated that both had a normative malleable attitude 
towards Russia. While Germany scored near the boundary between malleable and intransigent, meaning 
that it was willing to cooperate with Russia, but had significant concerns over differences, Italy scored 
higher, indicating that it had a friendlier and more cooperative attitude towards Russia. 
 Both nations thus perceived Russia as a partner, or at least an important player in finding a 
political solution to the conflict. German and Italian arguments against economic sanctions rested on the 
assumption that they would drive Russia away from the negotiation table. Initially, Russia was called 
upon to use its influence in stopping the violence and participate in dialogue and negotiations. Italy and 
Germany shared their views on the Ukrainian-Russian case. 
However, after April 17th the argument of refraining from implementing economic sanctions to 
make dialogue and negotiation possible was less valid. Russia came to the negotiation table at Geneva 
and agreed with the US, the EU, and Ukraine on the steps which had to be taken to deescalate, but they 
did not act on their promises. Faith in Russia’s willingness to negotiate and act on its commitments was 
tested.  
After the Geneva accords, Germany initially praised Russia for its constructive tone. They called 
on both Russia and Ukraine to exercise maximum restraint and to act according to their commitments 
in the accord (25-04-2014). Nevertheless, the cultural discourse increasingly points towards Russia’s 
responsibility for acting according to its commitments to the Geneva accords (08-05-2014; 14-04-2014; 
28-04-2014; 02-05-2014). Germany additionally points out that Russian partnership in the crisis is a 
necessity and that it is through much work the Russians may be convinced to negotiate (14-04-2014).  
 Germany did not argue for tougher sanctions, because they want to keep paths to dialogue open. 
With the stage-2 sanctions, Germany argues that Russia understands the EU’s position. A competition 
of public declarations for tougher sanctions does not help solve the crisis. Steinmeier argues, that 
escalating rhetoric and sanctions may lead to a new split in Europe. So all must focus on de-escalation 
(17-05-2014; 30-05-2014).  
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 In June, German perceptions of Russia’s willingness to act on its commitments at first slightly 
improved when Russia accepted the election of Petro Poroshenko as president of Ukraine, they seemed 
willing to negotiate further, and Russia retracted its right to intervene in Ukraine (26-05-2014; 08-06-
2014; 26-06-2014). Germany and Italy still held off economic sanctions in order not to abandon the 
chance for a diplomatic solution to the conflict or to prevent Europe from being split (16-04-2014; 10-
06-2014). 
 Nevertheless, an increase in the violence after the shooting of an Ukrainian helicopter over 
eastern Ukraine, created a changing attitude. Germany demanded a clear explanation from Russia (26-
06-2014). In July, talks between Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany resulted in a joint agreement. 
Germany pointed out that all parties had to implement the agreed points as quickly as possible (01-07-
2014; 02-07-2014). However, quickly thereafter violence increased again and MH17 was shot down. 
Germany stated that Russia did not seem to put the separatists under pressure and did not keep to their 
commitments.  
As a result, Russia became increasingly framed as an uncivilised geopolitical power with no 
interest in negotiation. German and Italian role conceptions of Russia were thus delegitimised and no 
longer held argumentative value. Germany realised that Russia would not take concrete steps on its own 
and lost its trust in Russia as a partner. Therefore, they changed their position on sanctions and were 
reluctantly willing to put more pressure on Russia in order to get them to act on their commitments (21-
07-2014; 23-07-2014). 
The German shift, because of the broken trust that Russia would act on its promises, made 
economic sanctions a real possibility. This put Germany, as the EU´s largest economy, at the head of 
nations seeking a tougher action on Russia. After the change in German attitudes, Italy became the 
biggest obstacle to tougher sanctions (Financial Times, 13-07-2014). When on July 1st 2014, Italy took 
over the Presidency of the Council from Greece, it gained the power to set the agenda and steer debate 
in Brussels. Critics insisted that Italy would use this power to delay debates over economic sanctions 
(Financial Times, 13-07-2014). In their statements, Italy tried to counter the perception of Russian 
untrustworthiness with the argument that Russia was still an indispensable player and that they were 
needed for a lasting political solution, which could not come about through economic sanctions (30-04-
2014). Nevertheless, when MH17 was shot down it was clear that Russia was prepared to keep on 
violating fundamental principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-violence, and human rights. 
On July 24th 2014, Mogherini made a clear statement blaming Russia for the violent situation 
in eastern Ukraine which led to the crash and the death of many civilians. She said: “Russia has publicly 
ensured their willingness to negotiate on various occasions over recent months, in Geneva and, most 
recently, in Berlin a few weeks ago. But they have not backed that pledge with concrete action and the 
results are now there for all to see” (24-07-2014). This drove Italy to recognise that the inconsistency 
between Russian publicly declared intentions and concrete deeds would make further negotiations 
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unsuccessful. They therefore decided to support a strong and unified signal from the EU with the goal 
to convince Moscow to act on its declared intentions (24-07-2014; 29-07-2014). 
 Even though it took a while, especially for Italy, to accept the framing of Russia as an 
untrustworthy and aggressive dialogue partner, the fourth hypothesis can be confirmed. Both German 
and Italian consent to economic sanctions accepting was driven by Russia’s framed identity as an 
uncivilised aggressive power and an untrustworthy dialogue partner.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis’ goal was to explain German and Italian consent to economic sanctions against Russia despite 
their initial reluctance. Based on realism this agreement would have been subject to hard-bargaining and 
lead to a LDC compromise, meaning that the agreement would be full of exceptions and loopholes. The 
economic sanctions that were announced though, caused much surprise amongst academics and 
journalists since they contained more action than was deemed possible with such diverging interests and 
positions in the Ukraine crisis.  
 The question then is how this agreement can be explained. Realist assumptions on self-
maximising utility and self-minimising damage would predict that the EUMS would not have agreed 
with an agreement that could potentially cause harm to their economies, or it would have been an LDC 
compromise without much effect. 
 The first hypothesis assumed that the sanctions had an effect on the Russian and EUMS’ 
economies, even though they were a compromise and did not touch Russia´s dependence on energy 
revenues. Especially when taking into account the Russian counter-measures which were provoked by 
the EU economic sanctions. EU exports to Russia declined significantly and attempts to circumvent the 
legal barriers through Serbia, Belarus and other third countries, which were not subject to the sanction 
regime, were limited. Russia increased its control over import from these countries and the numbers 
show that this could not make up for revenue and business lost. Economic losses on both sides therefore 
ran into billions of euros. Nevertheless, the Russian economy was hit harder by the sanctions (enhanced 
effect because of the decline in oil revenues) than the EU’s. 
 The sanctions were therefore not a costless LDC compromise which could have been easily 
agreed to by the EUMS. Since the EU’s internal unity proved to be surprisingly resilient, this thesis 
argued that the mechanism of normative entrapment could explain why Germany and Italy put principles 
over material interests.  
Hypotheses two and three were based on two critical conditions for normative entrapment to be 
the likely cause of an agreement. The third condition, which was precedent, was already established to 
be true, because the EU had significant policy and political investments in Ukraine. The second 
hypothesis dealt with relevance and whether Germany and Italy thought the EU’s normative framework 
to be applicable to the Ukraine crisis. This proved to be correct in that both Germany and Italy used the 
same value- and rights-based norms that were identified by the EU regarding the various stages of the 
crisis in Ukraine. Since the national discourses matched that of the EU, this indicates that the normative 
rhetoric used by the EU, which was thus at the basis of CFSP agreement, was deemed applicable by 
both Germany and Italy. 
The third hypothesis, which was split in two, found that both EUMS also found the used 
normative to be uncontroversial, because it is part of treaties and accords which were democratically 
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accepted and ratified by both countries. Nevertheless, the behavioural implications, accept the part about 
denouncing the actions violating those principles, were not accepted by all. This led to a logic of arguing, 
wherein both Germany and Italy used the EU’s identified value-based norms of dialogue and 
negotiation, to argue against economic sanctions. Their arguments rested mainly on the framing of 
Russia as a trustworthy partner, or at least as an important player in the Ukraine crisis that was needed 
for a political solution to come about. Their argument was in favour of dialogue, negotiations, and the 
fear that Russia would become unwilling to attend or commit itself to international agreements if it 
would be hit by economic sanctions.  
The examination of cultural discourse by Germany and Italy indicated that it became 
increasingly hard for both EUMS to frame Russia as a trustworthy partner in negotiations. After the 
Geneva accords it was clear that Russia was unwilling to act on its commitments to the EU, the US, and 
Ukraine. The situation in the Donbass did not deescalate and when Ukrainian military aircraft and flight 
MH17 were shot down, German and Italian arguments lost their legitimacy and thus their value. 
Therefore, just one legitimate perception of Russia remained, namely an untrustworthy state that had to 
be forced to act on its commitments. Unless they were willing to be subject to social sanctions of their 
peers, Germany and Italy thus had no option but to agree to economic sanctions.  
The answer to the question: To what extent can normative entrapment explain German and 
Italian consent to the CFSP economic sanctions against Russia, following the events in Ukraine between 
November 21st 2013 and July 31st 2014, despite their initial reluctance due to potential economic and 
political costs?, therefore has to be that a critical combination of pre-existing policy and political 
commitments to Ukraine, the uncontroversiality of the norms, and the acceptance of the normative, but 
disagreement on its behavioural implications which led to a logic of arguing, indicates that both EUMS 
were ‘trapped’ inside the EU’s normative framework and consequently in their own set of norms.  
The sanctions were legitimised on an ethical responsibility which was not only agreed to by 
Germany and Italy, but a fortiori was also co-shaped by them as signatories to the treaties and members 
of the Union. This left them to argue against sanctions within a normative framework that was as much 
their own as it was the EU’s. Their argument could no longer hold after Russia showed time-and-again 
that it was not living up to its promises in the negotiations. The combination of the need to send a 
message to Russia and the unwillingness of Russia to change its behaviour, made it necessary for 
Germany and Italy to agree in order to force Russia to adhere to its promises.  
Of course it is difficult to ascribe EUMS consent to economic sanctions entirely to normative 
entrapment. A factor for Italian consent that has not been discussed in this thesis is Frederica 
Mogherini’s bid to succeed Catherine baroness Ashton as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. According to an article on July 15th 2014, Poland and the Baltic states were 
uneasy about her soft stance on Russia (Euractiv, 15-07-2014). Italian consent could therefore have been 
the result of reciprocity or as a sign of good-will to the other EUMS in order to get her the job. 
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Another factor for agreement could have been external pressure. Sanctions are often part of a 
collaboration with other institutions or countries, like the UN or the United States. Therefore, it cannot 
be excluded that there has been behind-the-scene pressure from others on reluctant EUMS to adopt the 
sanctions. In order to create a full explanation on how the agreement on economic sanctions came to be 
and to increase our understanding of CFSP decision-making processes and the EU as an international 
actor, future research on this topic should look into these options. 
Nevertheless, it does not matter for the outcome whether Germany and Italy did consent because 
they were convinced. Acting against the sanctions would mean that they would act against their own 
principles or because they were afraid of potential social sanctions. This thesis therefore has made it 
clear that normative entrapment can serve as a legitimate explanation for members of a political 
community to act against their direct (material) interests in order to be part of something larger and thus 
sheds more light on the EU as an international actor, the workings of the CFSP, and the factors that help 
shape institutional agreements. 
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Annex A: Database Germany 
 
The table below is filled with dates when the press release/speech/interview/article was posted online 
on the website of the German Auswärtiges Amt. It is a selection based on the topics of Ukraine and 
Russia between January 1st and December 31st 2014.5  
Press releases Speeches Interviews Articles 
21-11-2013 5-12-2013 15-12-2013 18-12-2013 14-05-2014 
26-11-2013 10-12-2013 27-01-2014 21-01-2014 15-05-2014 
1-12-2013 17-12-2013 07-02-2014 27-01-2014 20-05-2014 
9-12-2013 29-01-2014 14-02-2014 27-01-2014 20-05-2014 
11-12-2013 20-03-2014 23-02-2014 29-01-2014 23-05-2014 
22-01-2014 16-04-2014 24-02-2014 04-02-2014 26-05-2014 
26-01-2017 25-04-2014 18-03-2014 05-02-2014 10-06-2014 
18-02-2014 07-05-2014 24-03-2014 08-02-2014 16-06-2014 
18-02-2014 08-05-2014 26-03-2014 10-02-2014 17-06-2014 
18-02-2014 08-05-2014 14-04-2014 14-02-2014 18-06-2014 
19-02-2014 09-05-2014 15-04-2014 17-02-2014 24-06-2014 
19-02-2014 09-05-2014 17-04-2014 18-02-2014 26-06-2014 
21-02-2014 09-05-2014 17-04-2014 21-02-2014 02-07-2014 
22-02-2014 15-05-2014 22-04-2014 01-03-2014 09-07-2014 
27-02-2014 20-05-2014 27-04-2014 06-03-2014 11-07-2014 
28-02-2014 20-05-2014 29-04-2014 07-03-2014 18-07-2014 
01-03-2014 28-05-2014 30-04-2014 10-03-2014 21-07-2014 
02-03-2014 06-06-2014 06-05-2014 11-03-2014  
04-03-2014 13-06-2014 17-05-2014 11-03-2014  
11-03-2014 13-06-2014 17-05-2014 13-03-2014  
12-03-2014 18-06-2014 30-05-2014 13-03-2014  
14-03-2014 28-06-2014 08-06-2014 17-03-2014  
31-03-2014 01-07-2014 19-06-2014 18-03-2014  
01-04-2014 08-07-2014 01-07-2014 18-03-2014  
17-04-2014 23-07-2014 09-07-2014 19-03-2014  
23-04-2014 25-07-2014 18-07-2014 20-03-2014  
25-04-2014 27-07-2014 20-07-2014 20-03-2014  
27-04-2014  22-07-2014 22-03-2014  
03-05-2014  22-07-2014 23-03-2014  
08-05-2014  27-07-2014 26-04-2014  
26-05-2014  28-07-2014 02-04-2014  
05-06-2014   07-04-2014  
09-06-2014   07-04-2014  
14-06-2014   09-04-2014  
18-06-2014   16-04-2014  
02-07-2014   23-04-2014  
02-07-2014   23-04-2014  
07-07-2014   29-04-2014  
09-07-2014   30-04-2014  
14-07-2014   02-05-2014  
17-07-2014   04-05-2014  
18-07-2014   06-05-2014  
18-07-2014   08-05-2014  
21-07-2014   08-05-2014  
30-07-2014   09-05-2014  
31-07-2014   09-05-2014  
Table 10 Created with the help of the web archive of the German Auswärtiges Amt (http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv_node.html).  
                                                             
5 See: Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Web Archive‘. 
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Annex B: German discourse categorised 
 
German categorised discourse
67
 
                                                             
6 The colour black contains press releases, red is used for speeches, green for interviews, and purple for the 
remainder. Furthermore, A, B, C et cetera refer to multiple statements that have been made on that same date. 
18-02-2014 (A) thus represents the first statement, 18-02-2014 (B) for the second and so on.  
7 See: Auswärtiges Amt, ‘Web Archive‘. 
Events Institutional Geopolitical Legal Cultural 
1. Yanukovych 
suspends the 
signing of 
the EU 
Association 
Agreement 
in Vilnius 
26-01-2014 
18-02-2014 (B) 
18-02-2014 (C) 
19-02-2014 (B) 
21-02-2014 
17-12-2013 
20-12-2014 
27-01-2014 (A) 
5-02-2014 
10-02-2014 
21-02-2014 
5-12-2013 
29-01-2014 
21-11-2013 
1-12-2013 
9-12-2013 
11-12-2013 
26-01-2014 
18-02-2014 (A) 
18-02-2014 (B) 
18-02-2014 (C) 
19-02-2014 (A) 
5-12-2013 
15-12-2013 
7-02-2014 
14-02-2014 
18-12-2013 
21-01-2014 
27-01-2014 (B) 
29-01-2014 
4-02-2014 
8-02-2014 
10-02-2014 
14-02-2014 
17-02-2014 
18-02-2014 
26-11-2013 
1-12-2013 
9-12-2013 
11-12-2013 
22-01-2014 
10-12-2013 
17-12-2013 
27-01-2014 
17-02-2014 
2. Yanukovych 
ousted from 
power 
  22-02-2014 
23-02-2014 
24-02-2014 
27-02-2014 
3. Violence in 
the Crimea 
  28-02-2014 28-02-2014 
4. Russian 
parliament 
approves the 
use of force 
in Ukraine 
1-03-2014 
4-03-2014 
1-03-2014 
10-03-2014 
2-03-2014 1-03-2014 
2-03-2014 
4-03-2014 
6-03-2014 
7-03-2014 
10-03-2014 
1-03-2014 
2-03-2014 
4-03-2014 
10-03-2014 
5. Crimean 
referendum 
11-03-2014 
14-03-2014 
18-03-2014 
11-03-2014 (A) 
11-03-2014 (B) 
17-03-2014 
18-03-2014 (A) 
18-03-2014 (B) 
26-03-2014 
11-03-2014 
12-03-2014 
14-03-2014 
31-03-2014 
20-03-2014 
24-03-2014 
26-03-2014 
11-03-2014 (B) 
13-03-2014 (B) 
19-03-2014 
20-03-2014 (B) 
23-03-2014 
11-03-2014 
12-03-2014 
14-03-2014 
31-03-2014 
20-03-2014 
11-03-2014 (B) 
13-03-2014 (A) 
13-03-2014 (B) 
17-03-2014 
18-03-2014 (A) 
18-03-2014 (B) 
19-03-2014 
20-03-2014 (A) 
20-03-2014 (B) 
14-03-2014 
20-03-2014 
17-03-2014 
20-03-2014 (A) 
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22-03-2014 
23-03-2014 
6. Donetsk and 
Luhansk 
protests and 
referenda 
16-04-2014 
25-04-2014 
7-05-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
18-06-2014 
15-04-2014 
17-05-2014 (A) 
2-04-2014 
7-02-2014 (B) 
16-04-2014 
30-04-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
8-05-2014 (B) 
9-05-2014 (A) 
9-05-2014 (B) 
16-6-2014 
17-06-2014 
24-06-2014 
 
16-04-2014 
7-05-2014 
20-05-2014 (B) 
28-05-2014 
13-06-2014 (A) 
27-04-2014 
6-05-2014 
17-05-2014 (B) 
2-04-2014 
9-04-2014 
29-04-2014 
2-05-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
10-06-2014 
18-06-2014 
27-04-2014 
8-05-2014 
26-05-2014 
18-06-2014 
16-04-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
15-05-2014 
14-04-2014 
15-04-2014 
17-04-2014 (A) 
17-04-2014 (B) 
22-04-2014 
27-04-2014 
30-04-2014 
17-05-2014 (A) 
17-05-2014 (B) 
8-06-2014 
19-06-2014 
2-04-2014 
7-02-2014 (A) 
9-04-2014 
23-04-2014 
2-05-2014 
4-05-2014 
6-05-2014 
8-05-2014 (B) 
14-05-2014 
15-05-2014 
20-05-2014 (A) 
20-05-2014 (B) 
23-05-2014 
26-05-2014 
10-06-2014 
24-06-2014 
17-04-2014 
23-04-2014 
25-04-2014 
27-04-2014 
26-05-2014 
14-06-2014 
21-06-2014 
16-04-2014 
7-05-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
8-05-2014 (B) 
9-05-2014 (A) 
9-05-2014 (B) 
9-05-2014 (C) 
15-05-2014 
20-05-2014 (A) 
6-06-2014 
13-06-2014 
18-06-2014 
14-04-2014 
27-04-2014 
29-04-2014 
30-04-2014 
7-02-2014 (B) 
29-04-2014 
8-05-2014 (A) 
26-06-2014 
7. Signing of 
EU 
Association 
Agreement 
with 
Ukraine 
28-06-2014 
8-07-2014 
9-07-2014 
9-07-2014 
11-07-2014 
2-07-2014 
8-07-2014 
1-07-2014 
7-07-2014 
9-07-2014 
28-06-2014 
1-07-2014 
1-07-2014 
2-07-2014 
11-07-2014 
8-07-2014 
9-07-2014 
8. Malaysia 
Airlines 
flight MH17 
shot down 
over eastern 
Ukraine 
21-07-2014 
23-07-2014 
25-07-2014 
27-07-2014 
22-07-2014 
27-07-2014 
28-07-2014 
21-07-2014 
 
23-07-2014 
25-07-2014 
22-07-2014 
23-07-2014 
18-07-2014 
20-07-2014 
27-07-2014 
18-07-2014 (A) 
18-07-2014 (B) 
21-07-2014 
23-07-2014 
25-07-2014 
27-07-2014 
20-07-2014 
22-07-2014 
27-07-2014 
28-07-2014 
18-07-2014 
21-7-2014 
9. EU 
economic 
sanctions 
against 
Russia 
30-07-2014 
31-07-2014 
  30-07-2014 
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Annex C: Database Italy 
 
The table below is filled with dates when the press release/speech/interview/article was posted online 
on the website of the Italian Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale. It is a 
selection based on the topics of Ukraine and Russia between January 1st and December 31st 2014.8  
Press releases Speeches Interviews/Articles In detail 
20-01-2014 06-05-2014 24-11-2013 25-11-2013 26-05-2014 
24-01-2014  25-11-2013 26-11-2013 27-05-2014 
24-01-2014  27-12-2013 09-12-2013 13-06-2014 
28-01-2014  20-02-2014 16-12-2013 21-06-2014 
19-02-2014  03-03-2014 16-12-2013 23-06-2014 
22-02-2014  03-03-2014 29-01-2014 25-06-2014 
26-02-2014  09-03-2014 07-02-2014 03-07-2014 
28-02-2014  14-03-2014 10-02-2014 07-07-2014 
01-03-2014  23-03-2014 10-02-2014 08-07-2014 
02-03-2014  12-04-2014 20-02-2014 09-07-2014 
02-03-2014  19-04-2014 21-02-2014 09-07-2014 
02-03-2014  07-05-2014 28-02-2014 22-07-2014 
10-03-2014  12-05-2014 03-03-2014  
13-03-2014  25-05-2014 04-03-2014  
16-03-2014  01-06-2014 05-03-2014  
25-03-2014  03-06-2014 05-03-2014  
17-04-2014  04-06-2014 07-03-2014  
23-04-2014  24-07-2014 10-03-2014  
25-04-2014  29-07-2014 11-03-2014  
29-04-2014   12-03-2014  
03-05-2014   12-03-2014  
06-05-2014   14-03-2014  
15-05-2014   17-03-2014  
23-05-2014   18-03-2014  
25-05-2014   19-03-2014  
25-05-2014   25-03-2014  
25-05-2014   25-03-2014  
28-05-2014   01-04-2014  
12-06-2014   02-04-2014  
12-06-2014   05-04-2014  
01-07-2014   14-04-2014  
04-07-2014   14-04-2014  
17-07-2014   16-04-2014  
19-07-2014   16-04-2014  
23-07-2014   17-04-2014  
29-07-2014   25-04-2014  
   30-04-2014  
   06-05-2014  
   07-05-2014  
   08-05-2014  
   12-05-2014  
   12-05-2014  
   14-05-2014  
   14-05-2014  
   19-05-2014  
   19-05-2014  
Table 11 Created with the help of the web archive of the Italian Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della 
Cooperazione Internazionale (http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie). 
                                                             
8 See: Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della cooperazione Internazionale, ‘News Archives‘. 
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Annex D: Italian discourse categorised 
 
Categories Italy
910
 
                                                             
9 The colour black contains press releases, red is used for speeches, green for interviews, and purple for the 
remainder. Furthermore, A, B, C et cetera refer to multiple statements that have been made on that same date. 
18-02-2014 (A) thus represents the first statement, 18-02-2014 (B) for the second and so on.  
10 See: Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della cooperazione Internazionale, ‘News Archives ‘. 
Events Institutional Geopolitical Legal Cultural 
1. Yanukovych 
suspends the 
signing of 
the EU 
Association 
Agreement 
in Vilnius 
19-02-2014 20-01-2014 
24-11-2013 
25-11-2013 
20-02-2014 
28-01-2014 
10-02-2014 (A) 
10-02-2014 (B) 
20-02-2014 
20-01-2014 
24-01-2014 (A) 
24-01-2014 (B) 
28-01-2014 
19-02-2014 
24-11-2013 
25-11-2013 
26-11-2013 
9-12-2014 
16-12-2013 (A) 
16-12-2013 (B) 
29-01-2014 
7-02-2014 
10-02-2014 (B) 
20-02-2014 
21-02-2014 
27-12-2013 
20-02-2014 
2. Yanukovych 
ousted from 
power 
26-02-2014 22-02-2014   
3. Violence in 
the Crimea 
28-02-2014 
28-02-2014 
 28-02-2014  
4. Russian 
parliament 
approves the 
use of force 
in Ukraine 
1-03-2014 
2-03-2014 (A) 
2-03-2014 (B) 
2-03-2014 (C) 
13-03-2014 
3-03-2014 (A) 
9-03-2014 
3-03-2014 
5-03-2014 (A) 
5-03-2014 (B) 
7-03-2014 
10-03-2014 
14-03-2014 
3-03-2014 (A) 
3-03-2014 (B) 
1-03-2014 
2-03-2014 (B) 
2-03-2014 (C)  
10-03-2014 
13-03-2014 
3-03-2014 (A) 
3-03-2014 (B) 
14-03-2014 
3-03-2014 
4-03-2014 
5-03-2014 (A) 
7-03-2014 
10-03-2014 
11-03-2014 
12-03-2014 (A) 
12-03-2014 (B) 
10-03-2014 
9-03-2014 
12-03-2014 (A) 
14-03-2014 
5. Crimean 
referendum 
16-03-2014 
23-03-2014 
19-03-2014 
 
17-03-2014 16-03-2014 
25-03-2014 
23-03-2014 
17-03-2014 
18-03-2014 
19-03-2014 
25-03-2014 (A) 
25-03-2014 (B) 
1-04-2014 
2-04-2014 
5-04-2014 
25-03-2014 (A) 
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6. Donetsk and 
Luhansk 
protests and 
referenda 
17-04-2014 
23-04-2014 
25-04-2014 
6-05-2014 
15-05-2014 
28-05-2014 
12-06-2014 (A) 
12-06-2014 (B) 
12-04-2014 
19-04-2014 
12-05-2014 
14-04-2014 (A) 
16-04-2014 (A) 
6-05-2014 
8-05-2014 
14-05-2014 (A) 
14-05-2014 (B) 
19-05-2014 (B) 
23-05-2014 
19-04-2014 
 
17-04-2014 
25-04-2014 
29-04-2014 
5-05-2014 
6-05-2014 
25-05-2014 (A) 
25-05-2014 (B) 
25-05-2014 (C) 
6-05-2014 
12-04-2014 
19-04-2014 
7-05-2014 
12-05-2014 
25-05-2014 
1-06-2014 
3-06-2014 
4-06-2014 
14-04-2014 (A) 
14-04-2014 (B) 
16-04-2014 (A) 
17-04-2014 
25-04-2014 
6-05-2014 
7-05-2014 
12-05-2014 (A) 
14-05-2014 (B) 
19-05-2014 (A) 
26-05-2014 
27-05-2014 
13-06-2014 
21-06-2014 
23-06-2014 
25-06-2014 
25-04-2014 
19-04-2014 
30-04-2014 
12-05-2014 (B) 
 
7. Signing of 
EU 
Association 
Agreement 
with Ukraine 
4-07-2014 
7-07-2014 
 1-07-2014 
4-07-2014 
3-07-2014 
7-07-2014 
8-07-2014 
9-07-2014 (A) 
9-07-2014 (B) 
 
8. Malaysia 
Airlines 
flight MH17 
shot down 
over eastern 
Ukraine 
17-07-2014 
22-07-2014 
 19-07-2014 
23-07-2014 
 
19-07-2014 
23-07-2014 
24-07-2014 
9. EU economic 
sanctions 
against 
Russia 
29-07-2014 
29-07-2014 
 
 29-07-2014 29-07-2014 
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Annex E: Official EU discourse 
 
                                                             
11 Press release 6767/14 
12 Press release 7196/14. 
13 Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, 06-03-2014 & European Council, ‘Remarks by 
president of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy following the extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of 
State or Government on Ukraine’, 6-03-2014. 
Date Event Meetings Decisions 
21-11-2013 Yanukovych suspends 
the signing of the EU 
Association Agreement 
in Vilnius 
20-02-2014 FAC meeting11 “We condemn in the strongest terms all 
use of violence. Those responsible for 
grave human rights violations should be 
brought to justice” 
 
“We call for an immediate end to the 
violence, full respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” 
 
“We call on all sides to engage […] in a 
meaningful dialogue, to fulfil the 
legitimate democratic aspirations of the 
Ukrainian people” 
22-02-2014 Yanukovych ousted 
from power 
  
27/28-02-2014 Violence in the Crimea   
01-03-2014 Russian parliament 
approves the use of force 
in Ukraine 
03-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
FAC12 
Strongly condemns “clear violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity by acts of aggression by the 
Russian armed forces […]” 
 
Considers actions “clear breach of the UN 
Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, 
as well as Russia’s specific commitments 
to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity under the Budapest 
Memorandum of 1994 and the bilateral 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Partnership of 1997” 
 
Does not recognise the referendum of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea since it is 
a “clear breach of the Ukrainian 
constitution” 
 
Calls for “full respect of the principles of 
and obligations under international law” 
06-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council13 
Strongly condemn “the unprovoked 
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity by the Russian 
Federation and call on the Russian 
Federation to immediately withdraw its 
armed forces” 
 
“The solution to the crisis in Ukraine must 
be based on territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, 
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as well as the strict adherence to 
international standards” 
 
Consider the decision by Crimea “to hold a 
referendum on the future status of the 
territory in contrary to the Ukrainian 
Constitution and therefore illegal” 
 
The EU has “a special responsibility for 
peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. 
We will pursue these objectives using all 
available channels” 
 
The EU will participate deescalating the 
situation and has the objective to “build 
confidence between parties, watch over the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
country, protect all citizens against 
intimidations, watch over the rights of 
minorities, help to prepare free and fair 
elections, and monitor implementation of 
agreements and commitments” 
 
Restore the relationship with the Russian 
Federation “based on mutual interest and 
respect of international obligations” 
 
“The solution to the crisis would be found 
through negotiations” 
 
“Any further steps by The Russian 
Federation to destabilise the situation in 
Ukraine would lead to additional and far 
reaching consequences for relations in a 
broad range of economic areas” 
 
“Energy and energy security are an 
important part of the Union’s external 
relations. We will continue our efforts to 
ensure security of supply” 
 
“Most serious challenge to security on our 
continent” 
 
“We want a solution in full respect of 
international law and the territorial 
integrity of countries” 
 
“The situation must de-escalate – and 
failure by Russia to do so will have serious 
consequences on our bilateral relationship” 
 
“The solution to the crisis should be found 
through negotiations” 
 
“dialogue is the only way out” 
 
“The majority of the people of Ukraine 
made a decisive choice in favour of our 
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European values. It was a civilisation 
choice” 
16-03-2014 Crimean referendum 17-03-2014  
FAC meeting14 
Strongly condemned the referendum in 
Crimea and “did not recognise its 
outcome” 
 
Considers “the holding of the referendum 
illegal, and a clear breach of the Ukrainian 
constitution” 
 
“the Crimea referendum was held with 
visible presence of armed soldiers. The EU 
does not and cannot recognise the outcome 
of a referendum organised under such 
circumstances” 
 
The negative developments are a “clear 
breach of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” 
 
The EU “remains ready to facilitate 
dialogue between Ukraine and Russia” 
 
Calls on Russia to “take steps to de-
escalate the crisis” and warns that “heavier 
economic sanctions would follow in case 
of further actions by Russia to destabilise 
the situation in Ukraine” 
20/21-03-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council15 
Supports “the Ukrainian people and their 
right to choose their own future” 
 
Welcomes Ukraine’s “commitment to 
ensure the representative nature and 
inclusiveness of governmental structures” 
 
The EU remains committed to the 
“sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine” 
 
The EU “does not recognise the illegal 
referendum in Crimea, which is a clear 
violation of the Ukrainian Constitution. It 
strongly condemns the illegal annexation 
of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian 
Federation and will not recognise it” 
 
Asks the Commission to “propose 
economic, trade and financial restrictions 
regarding Crimea for rapid 
implementation” 
 
Firmly believes “that there is no place for 
the use of force and coercion to change 
borders in Europe in the 21st century” 
 
The Russian actions are in clear breach of 
the Helsinki process. 
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The EU “has a special responsibility for 
peace and stability in Europe. It will 
remain at the forefront of efforts to 
facilitate and engage in a meaningful 
dialogue involving Ukraine and Russia” 
 
“Any further steps by the Russian 
Federation to destabilise the situation in 
Ukraine would lead to additional and far 
reaching consequences for relations in a 
broad range of economic areas” 
 
 
7-04/11-05- 
2014 
Donetsk and Luhansk 
protests and referenda 
15-04-2014  
FAC meeting16 
Condemns “actions undertaken by armed 
individuals in cities of Eastern Ukraine” 
 
Calls on “all parties to engage in a 
dialogue of a peaceful solution” 
 
Strong support for “Ukraine’s unity, 
sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity, and calls upon Russia to do 
likewise and to repudiate the latest lawless 
acts in Eastern Ukraine” 
 
It demands “Russia to call back its troops 
from the Ukrainian border and 
immediately withdraw the mandate of the 
Federation Council to use force on 
Ukrainian soil” 
 
“Any threat or use of force against Ukraine 
or any other countries is not acceptable 
and must stop immediately” 
 
Reiterates “its strong condemnation of the 
illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol to the Russia Federation and 
will not recognise it” 
 
States the “importance of Russia’s and 
Ukraine’s engagement in a meaningful 
dialogue” 
 
Reiterates its “commitment to stand by 
Ukraine” 
 
“Energy relations must be based on 
reciprocity, transparency, fairness, non-
discrimination, openness to competition 
and continued cooperation” 
12-05-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
FAC17 
The EU and its member states “can bring 
to the international stage the unique ability 
to combine, in a coherent and consistent 
manner, policies and tools ranging from 
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diplomacy, security and defence to 
finance, trade, development and human 
rights, as well as justice and migration” 
 
“Union’s ability to play a positive and 
transformative role in its external relations 
and as a global actor” 
 
Recalls “the provisions in the EU Treaty 
on consistency in external action and with 
other policies, and the responsibility of the 
Council and the European Commission to 
cooperate to that effect” 
 
“The EU’s policies and priorities should 
follow from common strategic objectives 
and a clear common vision of what the EU 
collectively wants to achieve in its external 
relations or in a particular conflict or crisis 
situation” 
 
Stresses the key importance of “conflict 
prevention to reduce the risk of outbreak 
or recurrence of violent conflict and 
human suffering” 
 
Recalls “”the importance of ensuring the 
greatest possible coherence between the 
Union’s and Member States’ actions to 
support partner countries” 
 
Strongly condemns “recent violent events 
in Ukraine and the organisation of the 
referendum in Eastern regions” 
 
Considers “illegitimate and illegal any 
referendum on Ukraine’s unity, 
sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity” 
23-06-2014 FAC meeting18 Expects “the Russian Federation to support 
the peace plan with specific de-escalation 
measures” 
 
Russia needs to “use its influence on the 
separatists to halt the violence and lay 
down their arms” 
 
Engage “in political-level consultations 
with the Russian Federation on the 
implementation aspects of the [DCFTA] 
agreement, in order to dispel Russian 
concerns about its possible effects” 
27-06-2014 Signing of EU 
Association Agreement 
with Ukraine 
26/27-06-2014  
Meeting of European 
Council19 
Calls on all to “cement the cessation of the 
military activities” 
 
Urges “the Russian Federation to actively 
use its influence over the illegally armed 
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groups and to stop the flow of weapons 
and militants across the border, in order to 
achieve rapid and tangible results in de-
escalation” 
 
Does “not recognise the illegal annexation 
of Crimea and Sevastopol” 
16-07-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
European Council20 
Support for “a peaceful settlement of the 
crisis in Ukraine, notably the urgent need 
to agree on a genuine and sustainable 
cease-fire by all parties” 
 
Condemns “the continuation of illegal 
activities by armed militants in Eastern 
Ukraine, including the occupation of 
public buildings, hostage-taking and armed 
attacks on Ukrainian law enforces and 
border guards” 
 
Expands travel ban “for actions 
undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence” 
 
Commits to “pursue trilateral talks on the 
conditions of gas supply from the Russian 
Federation to Ukraine […] Finding a swift 
agreement is important for safeguarding 
the security of supply and transit of natural 
gas through Ukraine to EU member states” 
17-07-2014 Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17 shot down over 
eastern Ukraine 
18-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council 
 
22-07-2014  
Extraordinary meeting of 
FAC21 
Strongly condemned “the continuation of 
illegal activities by armed militants in 
Eastern Ukraine and may consider the 
possible designation of these groups as 
terrorist organisations” 
 
Urged “the Russian Federation to actively 
use its influence over these groups to 
guarantee access to the crash site and to 
cooperate with OSCE monitors and 
international experts” 
 
Called on the separatists “to ensure full, 
immediate, safe and secure access to the 
crash site” 
 
“Those directly and indirectly responsible 
for the downing must be held accountable 
and brought to justice” 
 
Stresses “its support for a peaceful 
settlement of the crisis in Ukraine” and 
“for a sustainable ceasefire” 
25-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council  
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29/31-07-2014 EU economic sanctions 
against Russia approved 
unanimously 
29/31-07-2014  
Meeting of the Council22 
“It is meant as a strong warning: illegal 
annexation of territory and deliberate 
destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign 
country cannot be accepted in 21st century 
Europe” 
 
“the violence created spirals out of control 
and leads to the killing of almost 300 
innocent civilians in their flight from the 
Netherlands to Malaysia, the situation 
requires urgent and determined response” 
 
The EU “will fulfil its obligations to 
protect and ensure the security of its 
citizens” 
 
The EU “will stand by its neighbours and 
partners” 
 
“Since the beginning of the Ukrainian 
crisis, the European Union has been 
calling on the Russian leadership to 
work towards a peaceful resolution. 
We have done this collectively and 
bilaterally” 
 
“The Russian Federation and the 
European Union have important 
common interests. We will both 
benefit from open and frank dialogue, 
from increased cooperation and 
exchanges. But we cannot pursue this 
important positive agenda when 
Crimea is illegally annexed, when the 
Russian Federation supports armed 
revolt in Eastern Ukraine, when the 
violence unleashed kills innocent 
civilians” 
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